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Many management techniques have been discussed for application
to various segments of the research and development process. All
segments are analyzed to identify common problems and develop a
consistent set of techniques to facilitate Navy program management.
A selection model, program display, revised reporting techniques
,
and post-operational analysis are among the major topics discussed.
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Navy Research and Development Program Management
Introduction.
In our laboratory we have an Assistant Director in charge
of reading all articles that tell us how to run our own
business- -and writing letters to management explaining
why most of them do not apply.
Special Notice.
This notice is designed to save time for some readers. The thesis
is directed to two groups of people: those experienced in management
of R&D activities, and those just beginning their R&D duties. For the
former, the last section of Chapter 8 (Post-Operational Analysis),
Chapter 9 (Summary), and Chapter 10 (Conclusions), contain informa-
tion of interest. The other chapters describe and analyze the R&D
process and develop the lines of reasoning from which the conclusions
were derived.
Research and development articles typically begin with an impressive
array of statistics to justify the need for the topic study. R&D is big
2






growing rapidly (R&D expenditures by DoD in 1961 were about $4
3
billion ). More detailed statistics are included in Appendix A but the
statistics by themselves don't tell the whole story. They serve as a
common line of departure for systems analysts, psychologists, social
scientists, educators, consultants, and managers for study of the many
aspects of the R&D process. The spectrum of approaches and proposals
are brought together here to identify common problems and establish
consistent solutions.
The purpose here is not to replace managers, but rather to seek
procedures that will be useful to managers in controlling and reducing
the amount of uncertainty in decision-making and in paving the way
toward more precise and accurate planning. It is necessary to go
beyond the rejection technique used by the Assistant Director mentioned
in the opening quotation to the task of assembling a consistent set of
techniques to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of R&D manage-
ment.
The degree of skill in planning and controlling the research and
development process and the rate at which that skill is acquired consti-
tute a major positive control over future events- -both in improving
national standards and in maintaining an internationally competitive
posture. The planning of research and development is therefore a vital





The growth of R&D has brought the assertion that diminishing
returns have set in on R&D investments so that those investments are
4
coming into equilibrium with alternative investments; i.e.
,
the
current proportion of funds devoted to R&D is approaching the "best"
proportion. This is a very difficult situation to analyze, since the
purpose of R&D is to upset the equilibrium, and since the actual returns
on research are usually difficult to measure. Hence it is not surprising
to find disagreement on whether returns on alternative investments
have been equalized. But it does appear that a "profit squeeze" of
sorts is occurring, and the increased R&D efforts are yielding more
and more proposals. These conditions necessitate greater care and
improved techniques in project selection and control, and in measur-
ing and controlling progress in R&D
The emphasis on the need for better techniques for managing,
measuring, and controlling R&D does not mean that these areas are
being neglected; such study is in progress, and many proposals have
been successfully introduced. An example of the importance attached
to this area by the Department of Defense is the position of the Director
of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) as the most senior of
the assistants to the Secretary of Defense. In the Navy, the Assistant
Secretary (Research and Development)(ASN(R&D)), has the unusual





The problem is not one of oversight, but simply one of a need for
continuing improvements.
A more direct reason for concern with the management of R&D is
the government's heavy and growing emphasis on cost-effectiveness
techniques and considerations in general, and their applications to the
planning-programming-budgeting process in particular. While past
research and development efforts have yielded many outstanding
achievements, many items were developed at costs three to ten times
larger than estimates; large errors in prediction of completion time,
reliability, and effectiveness are also common. All disrupt the plan-
ning, and frequently force discontinuities on projects which don't
promise immediate returns. The Resource Management Systems
5
effort and Project PRIME can be expected to cast harsh light upon
R&D planning. In these days of long lead times, forewarned may not
be fore -armed, but a little homework may be helpful.
Briefly the major phases of R&D program formulation considered
in the following chapters are:
(1) Establish well-defined objectives at all levels of the organiza-
tion.
(2) Evaluate current and anticipated threats, commitments, and
capabilities.
(3) Develop a scenario.
(4) Formulate plans and policies.
(5) Search for potential projects.
(6) Evaluate military value of projects.
(7) Estimate project characteristics such as cost, reliability, and





(8) Select projects to be included in the program.
(9) Review program for balance.
(10) Establish administrative and funding flexibility.
(11) Establish effective feedback on analytical procedures employed
throughout the program.
These phases are ripe with uncertainties, and communications and
organizational difficulties.
The reasons for studying R&D management are summarized as
follows:
(1) R&D is a large and growing task.
(2) R&D efforts exert a profound influence on future strength and
well-being of the nation.
(3) There are no widely accepted procedures for conducting an
optimal R&D program, and most of the literature deals with
isolated portions of the program.
(4) Rapid growth of R&D expenditures and governmental interest
in cost effectiveness combine to require the study.
The study here is applied to the Navy RDT&E program, but the obser-
vations, results and conclusions are considered to be more generally
applicable.
The presentation begins with a condensed description of the Navy
RDT&E organization, emphasizing the handling of the planning-
programming -budgeting process. The second chapter discusses the
dominant role played by uncertainty in research and development, and
the resulting communications and organizational difficulties. Chapter
3 discusses the initial planning procedures and project genesis. The
sequential evaluation of proposed R&D projects is the subject of
Chapter 4. The fifth chapter develops criteria for project selection
and presents a model to assist the manager in the selection process.
Chapter 6 proposes a display to assist in program control and provide
15
information on the model constraints; additional control considera-
tions are presented in Chapter 7. Development of a data bank and
post-operational analysis are discussed in Chapter 8. Procedures
are summarized in Chapter 9 and conclusions are presented in
Chapter 10.
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Chapter 1. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
and the Navy Organization
The Navy was organized with a peculiar psychology which
"... frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic
into a dim world in which Neptune was god, Mahan his pro-
phet, and the U. S Navy the only true church.""
H. L. Stimson
Much has transpired within the Navy in recent years which refutes
the opening quotation. Significant steps have been taken away from
the traditional bilinear structure toward a unilinear structure in which
responsibility and authority may be clearly assigned. Most notable is
the re-organization of 1 May 1966, which placed the Chief of Naval
Material under the Chief of Naval Operations. The planning-program-
ming -budgeting process instituted by the Department of Defense (DoD)
has had far-reaching organizational effects. The handling of research
and development in the Navy is well spelled-out by the Navy RDT&E
7
Management Guide, a publication whose major shortcoming is that
apparently not enough people are aware of it.
This chapter presents a brief factual description of the Navy
offices and units having primary responsibilities in RDT&E manage-
ment. The organization charts stress RDT&E functions. Emphasis
is placed on activity interrelationships, the planning-programming-




B-18. This publication and Navy and DoD Instructions are the
primary sources of information for this chapter.
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its fuzzy beginnings to its conclusion as an operable system or com-
ponent, and the reporting procedures used in monitoring and controlling
the RDT&E effort. The systems analysis, operations analysis, and
management techniques of subsequent chapters will refer to the organi-
zation described here.
One limitation on this chapter is its dependence on instructions
and other formal guides. Informal meetings, telephone conversations,
and memos, which may actually play a major part in the organization's
operation, are generally omitted. The documents which prescribe the
formal structure in fact encourage informal communications and
cooperation; comments to the effect that "nothing in this instruction
shall be construed so as to restrict cooperation between parties" are
common.
The RDT&E effort is accounted for under the sixth of nine DoD
programs. It is divided into 6 funding categories which the Navy uses
in assigning responsibility and authority and which will be useful in
the discussion of the Navy R&D organization.
8Program 6--Research and Development
1. Research- -study to extend the frontiers of knowledge
2. Exploratory Development -seek new applications of
science and technology
3. Advanced Development- -more detailed exploration of
area of high potential requiring further investigation
to reduce the risk involved in large scale develop-
ment expenditures.
4. Engineering Development- -unit and component hard-
ware development
B-30 , pp IV-2-106.
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5. Management and Support
6. Operational Systems Development- -generally a large
project involving a combination of many components
and scientific disciplines for a specified purpose;
already approved for procurement and employment.
The descriptions give a general indication of the type of work
involved in each category. There is really a spectrum of R&D activity
corresponding to the uncertainty of the outcome, and the boundaries of
the categories are not well-defined. With the exception of the Research
category, all elements of the Navy program are oreinted toward a
9
specific mission in a particular environment.
Organization Structure and Responsibilities of Major RDT&tE Components
One of the major purposes of the creation of the Department of
Defense (DoD) was "to eliminate unnecessary duplication.
.
.particularly
in the field of research and engineering by besting its overall direction
10
and control in the Secretary of Defense. " The DoD organization is
presented in Figure 1-1. The Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E) ranks ahead of all other Assistant Secretaries
of Defense, and his deputy is a full Assistant Secretary. DDR&E has
the authority to approve, modify, or disapprove programs and projects
of the military departments and other DoD agencies, and to eliminate
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support promising ones. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have an
advisory role in research and development activities.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development)
(ASN(R&D)) exercises responsibility for Department-wide policy
guidance and supervision of all research, development, engineering,
test, and evaluation efforts within the Navy, and manages the congres-
sional appropriation category "Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation, Navy. " He has only a small staff of technical assistants
and is supported and assisted primarily by the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Development) (DCNO(D)), the Deputy Chief of Staff (R&D)
Marine Corps, the Chief of Naval Development (CND) who is also the
Deputy Chief of Naval Material (Development)(DCNM(D)), the Chief of
Naval Research (CNR), and the Project Managers of the SECNAV
Designated Projects. ASN(R&D) also provides direct supervision of
12
the Office of Naval Research,
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) , assisted in his R&D respon-
sibilities by DCNO(D), utilizes technological projections in making
long- and mid-range plans, and maintains a 10-year research and
development program to ensure a balanced effort consistent with
B-18, pp 1-2. Pages of the Navy RDT&E Manual are desig-
nated by chapter number or Appendix letter, a hyphen, and page
number of that chapter or appendix. The reference "pp 1-2" refers
to Chapter 1, page 2.
12
C-31, pp 1, 2; B-18, pp 1-4.
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future plans. DCNO(D) is charged with coordinating the Navy-
Advanced Development, Engineering Development and Operational
Systems Development programs and immediate requirements. CNO
is charged with the formidable task of appraising the potential mili-
tary worth of the 10-year R&D program with respect to its cost,
revising the program to obtain the optimum return on the R&D invest-
ment, and making appropriate recommendations to ASN(R&D). CNO
gives the final go-ahead on major development projects by approving
the Technical Development Plans (TDP), and after reviewing the
results of a completed R&D project may, with concurrence of CNM,
make recommendations to SECNAV for production. The organization
of the office of DCNO(D) is presented in Figure 1-3. The Commandant
of the Marine Corps (CMC) performs similar duties for the Marine
13
Corps. Figure 1-2 presents the Navy top management structure.
The Chief of Naval Material provides direction and management
coordination of the RDT&E Program of the Navy Material Support
Establishment (NMSE) in response to CNO/CMC requirements by
consolidating the approved RDT&E projects plans from the material
bureaus. CNM consults with the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) on
all personnel requirements, including training, for support of NMSE
developments expected to be introduced into the fleet. CNM appraises
the cost and effectiveness of the NMSE RDT&E Program, advises
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reconsideration of operational requirements when necessary. He
14
also provides technical and fiscal inputs to other Navy studies.
The Chief of Naval Development (CND/DCNM(D)) (see Figure
1-4 for organization chart) coordinates the Navy's Exploratory
Development Program for ASN(R&D), operating closely with CNR,
CNP, and Chief, BUMED. CND promulgates Exploratory Develop-
ment Goals (EDG), and reviews and coordinates proposals from the
NMSE, CMC, CNP, CNR, and Chief, BUMED. He appraises the
overall program balance and may recommend changes in funding to
ASN(R&D). CND makes an annual appraisal of opportunities afforded
by the Exploratory Development program for increased naval warfare
capabilities.
The Chief of Naval Research (CNR) heads the Office of Naval
Research (ONR) and is responsible for the conduct of basic and
applied research in augmentation of and in conjunction with the
research and development conducted by all other activities in the
Navy. He may also conduct Exploratory Development in collaboration
with developing agencies to assist in the orderly transition from
research to development. CNR coordinates Navy participation in
joint service scientific studies and related Navy studies. ONR
assumes financial responsibility for research projects, but may






, pp 8-9; B-65, pp E-24.
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offices of the Department of the Navy in proportion to their interest.
CNR is charged with a large share of the Navy's responsibility for
keeping current with scientific developments and trends on a world-
wide basis, and with modifying the direction of the Navy's research
accordingly. Most of ASN(R&D)'s support in managing the RDT&E
appropriations is supplied by CNR. CNR provides advice to ASN(R&D)
on research in general and on any modification of the Department of
the Navy's in-house capacity to perform research or development,
including government- owned contractor-operated facilities. All
research contracts with educational and non-profit institutions are
controlled by ONR, as are all Navy functions involving patents,
inventions, and copyrights. The ONR organization is depicted in
Figure 1-5. The Navy's laboratories— some 50 of them with an
annual workload amounting to about $550 million, or about 30% of the
annual Navy RDT&E budget- -are not under ONR control, but report
to the Director of Naval Laboratories (DNL), a civilian coequal with
CNR and CND.
Project Managers are assigned to Secretary of the Navy designated
projects to lead a highly centralized attack on a single high priority
problem or system development. They act under the guidance and
delegated authority of CNM to exercise technical, financial, and
administrative control over personnel, material, contractors, and
1 /


















all other resources required for the project. Support is generally
17
supplied by BuWeps or BuShips within the NMSE.
Primary cost-effectiveness responsibilities are vested with (1)
the Navy Program Planning Office of the Office of CNO, whose
director is Scientific Officer to the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA),
where most of its quantitative work is carried out; (2) the Office of
Program Appraisal, which provides a small staff capability to review
program cost-effectiveness for the Secretary of the Navy; and (3) the
Office of Naval Material (ONM), which presents technical and eco-
1
8
nomic data to CNM on requirement feasibility.
There are many other R&D activities in the Navy which perform
important duties, but the preceding discussion is representative of
the top R&D management. The R&D function may be traced from
these offices to various levels of the organization. Examples of the
R&D function in the Bureau of Naval Weapons and the Bureau of
Ships are shown in Figures 1-6 and 1-7 respectively. For a more
detailed presentation than given here, the reader is referred to the
Navy RDT&E Management Guide (B-18).
Numerous committees are formed to support the R&D effort.

































































































































































































(1) Navy Research and Development Committee— consists
of top Navy RDT&E management, operating on an informal
"official family" basis, meeting weekly when ASN(R&D)
is available; topics unrestricted.
(Z) Naval Research Advisory Committee- -consists of 15
civilians pre-eminent in science research and development;
4 meetings held annually, attended by Navy R&D top manage-
ment; provide advice on general policy, research trends,
and R&D administration.
(3) Navy Research and Development Review Board— considers
R&D planning objectives, annual R&D plans, and R&D
projects, and forwards the planning objectives and plans to
CNO and ASN(R&D) for approval. DCNO(D) is the chairman,
and members include high ranking representatives of the
operating forces from OP-03 (DCNO(Fleet Operations and
Readiness)). The board meets as directed by DCNO(D).
(4) Chief of Naval Operations Advisory Board (CAB)- -provides
advice and recommendations to CNO on Navy programs in
general with respect to strategic concepts, plans, policies,
and the budget. This is a top level review board for Naval
Operations and is conducted by the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations, CNM, and others. Meetings are scheduled at
the discretion of the Chairman, DCNO(D).19
Planning-Programming-and-Budgeting in the Navy
The top management of Navy RDT&E is concerned with long- and
medium-range planning and with the year-to-year conduct of R&D.
The planning-programming-budgeting process deals with the questions
(1) What would we like to do? ; (2) What resources do we have avail-
able to do it with? ; and (3) What is the best that we can do with these
limited resources? It compares plans and objectives with existing
capabilities and facilities and with the Congressional appropriations.
The planning considers strategic capability, defensive capability,
trooplift and fighting capability for limited war, and other "outputs"




traditionally been made in terms of defense system inputs ,and proba-
bly will continue to be made that way. The principal subdivisions of
20










Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
Civil Defense
General Provisions
The RDT&E appropriation, which conveniently corresponds
directly to DoD's Program 6, is further divided into eight principal
budget activities as follows:
1. Military sciences
2. Aircraft and related equipment
3. Missiles and related equipment
4. Military astronautics and related equipment
5. Ships and small craft and related equipment
6. Ordnance, combat vehicles, and related equipment
7. Other equipment
8. Program-wide management and support
The obvious gaps between planning terms and budget classifications
are to be bridged by the programming phase. The programming
phase is also designed to assist in making a continuous appraisal of
programs, in reporting progress, and in integrating the DoD infor-
22








, pp 3- 1 , 2,
33
The Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) --formerly known as the
Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Plan--is the summation of all
approved programs from all DoD components and is the foundation of the
Programming System. It may be represented as a three-dimensional
matrix or graph, with programs (outputs) each broken down into resource
requirements (inputs) on two of the axes, and the third axis represents
expenditures over time. (See Figure 1-8. ) The programs are further
subdivided into program elements, such as the Fleet Ballistic Missile
(FBM) System, VTOL aircraft, the EX-10 torpedo development, etc.
In classifying items in the DoD Programming System, the research
and development program is to include all effort which has not been
directly identified with other programs. Deciding when such identifica-
tion has occurred is one of several delicate interfaces of the system;
"identification" is typically interpreted as occurring when the decision
is made to produce for inventory.
An unfortunate drawback of the FYDP for RDT&E activities is that
it makes no provision for presently undefined but anticipated development
programs. The result is that casual glance at a particular FYDP gives
24
the impression that DoD intends to phase out R&D. Since this would
be a most improbable event, it is a deficiency in the FYDP's ability to
predict and plan future expenditures. It is not likely that the nature of
R&D will permit prediction and description of projects to be started in
3, 4, or 5 years in the detail required for DoD approval.
-
B-18, pp 3-1, 2.
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FI6URE 1-8 FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM
is
As will be described in the following pages, R&D project proposals
are developed by a well-specified sequence of documents. Several of
these steps involve R&D effort in the form of feasibility studies and pre-
liminary design. The Technical Development Plan (TDP), which is the
last stage prior to inclusion of a project in the FYDP, is a major study
of the system under consideration. The TDP represents a large expendi-
ture of scientific, engineering, and cost-analysis effort. The sequence
does not normally take five years, however, and therefore a number of
projects which are expected to begin within five years cannot be included
in the FYDP. Approved projects may have estimated production dates
and operational dates that are not much more accurate than R&D projects
without final approval. For example, if two projects which have just
recently completed the TDP phase, one with and one awaiting approval,
the FYDP will include the production and operating funds for the approved
project, and exclude entirely those projects awaiting that approval.
The FYDP is continually being updated to reflect approval of new
Technical Development Plans (TDP) and other changes; these changes
are subject to approval of the Secretary of Defense. The formal docu-
ment for submitting interim changes in an approved project is the
Program Change Request (PCR), formerly Program Change Proposal,
and threshold requirements are established for its use. For example,
any change in the programmed cost of $10 million or more in one year
for an R&D program element, or $25 million for the total program,
requires a PCR. The PCR requires detailed costing and a presentation
of advantages of the existing program; for a more detailed description
of the PCR and related procedures, the reader is referred to SECNAV
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Instruction 5000.24, ref. C-25. The Navy requests for changes are
reviewed by the Office of the Navy Comptroller for appropriation and
fiscal status implications, financial feasibility and balance, validity and
reasonableness of costs and pricing, and legality. The Comptroller of
DoD establishes standardized terminology, classifications, and proce-
dures for budgeting and accounting use by the services. These are
essential for consistency and for use of automated data processing tech-
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niques throughout the planning-programming-budgeting process.
The FYDP is supplemented, prior to the annual budget preparation,
by lists of requirements submitted by various activity levels to the
Secretary of Defense through the chain of command. CNR submits the
Navy Research Program; CND submits the Exploratory Development
Program; DCNO(D) submits coordinated requirements for the Advanced
Development, Engineering, and Operational Systems Development
Programs; and these are coordinated and balanced by ASN(R&D), CNO,
and the Secretary of the Navy before submission to DoD. These requests
usually exceed what can be approved, and are therefore accompanied by
a "justification" of each element. The justification is designed to show
that the proposal is consistent with procedural and legal requirements,
essential to performance of the assigned mission, the most effective and
economical method of accomplishing its purpose, feasible with respect
26
to timing and resource availability, and substantiated on its own merits.
25
B-18, pp 3-5, 6; 4-4.
26
Ibid .., pp 4-3.
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The lists of requirements and FYDP are reviewed by the Secretary
of Defense and his assistants in a "mark-up" process of reducing,
increasing, or eliminating items. Changes are explained by SECDEF
and his assistants by Program/Budget Decision documents, formerly
called Subject/Issue papers. There may be several hundred such papers
involved in the process of budget formulation, providing guidance for the
service activity levels. The military departments may then request
reconsideration of their proposals by means of reclama. The reclama
may request restoration of all or part of a reduction in budget estimate,
or make a more general alternative proposal in response to the
Secretary's action. The reclama are reviewed and the revised program
is converted to the appropriation structure for the three-year period to
be presented in the budget plan for submission to the President and
Congress. The program review is the primary means by which DDR&E
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exercises his responsibilities for coordinating service programs.
The Bureau of the Budget under the Treasury Department reviews,
revises, and approves the program submitted by the Secretary of Defense
and inserts it into the Executive Budget, which the President presents to
Congress. The Executive Budget estimates are considered by the Armed
Services Committee and the Appropriations Committees by both the
House and the Senate, who hold formal hearings with OSD and service
representatives. In FY 1963, the House Armed Services Committee




appropriation. The Subcommittee and Committee results are presented
to the full House of Representatives and Senate, a final budget is selected
and approved, and the approved appropriations are sent to all departments
for allocation. Specific Congressional changes are incorporated directly,
and the Navy must distribute the general and "spill-over" cut-backs and
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modifications among the various projects and activity levels.
This is again a complex and time-consuming process: for example,
a Congressional across-the-board reduction of the RDT&E appropriation
probably could not be applied directly as an across-the-board cut-back
of all RDT&E projects. Some projects may have been included at a
minimum level, below which it is impossible to operate to obtain any
useful output; others may have been funded at a higher level in order to
speed the final development but may actually be able to function more
efficiently at a lower funding level if the resulting delay is acceptable.
All the offices which combined to present the original budget requests
must again get together to allocate the available funds. Figure 1-9
presents a summary of the planning-programming-budgeting process as
it is applied to RDT&E in the Navy.
Major Navy and DoD Planning, Programming, and Reporting Documents
In order to promulgate objectives for guidance in planning, the Navy
and DoD use a number of documents. Other documents are used by the
activity levels to propose and implement action in either general or
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Specific reporting procedures are usedto monitor and control the
RDT&E effort and to communicate current advances and difficulties
throughout the R&D community. These documents are described in
this section to provide additional information on the manner in which
research and development is carried out in the Navy.
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP-FY) . This plan is prepared
annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to translate U. S. national objectives
into short-range military objectives. It includes a discussion of U. S.
military position in relation to our allies.
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP-FY) . This is another annual
JCS plan covering the years 5-9 from scheduled date of approval. It is
a more detailed and specific document than the JSCP, and is a primary
advanced planning input to budget estimate preparations and justifications.
It is developed in six parts; purpose, strategic appraisal, military
objectives, strategic concept, basic undertakings, and force tabulations
.
Joint Long-Range Strategic Study (JLRSS) . Covering a period of
years 10-13 from date of approval, it provides a broad strategic appraisal
for long-range development of support for national objectives.
Navy Long-Range Strategic Study (NLRSS). The NLRSS provides
the Navy's input to the JLRSS, but covers years 10-19. It stresses
scientific and technological feasibility and probable availability of
resources (rather than estimated budget/program constraints).
30
These documents are described in greater detail in references
C-24, C-4, and C-7. Specific instructions are listed with the descrip-
tions where applicable.
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Qualitative force requirements and noteworthy development areas are
included. The Director, Strategic Plans Division, under DCNO (Plans
& Policy), develops this study with assistance from other OPNAV offices,
CNM, and laboratories and study groups in the Department of the Navy.
Navy Mid-Range Study (NMS)
.
This is the input from the Navy to
the JSOP and its contents are similar. It is also used in formulating
R&D goals. The Director, Strategic Plans Division prepares this study
also.
Navy Mid-Range Objectives (MRO) . This plan must have been the
most difficult one to name: it is prepared by the Director, Long-Range
Objectives Group based on NLRSS, NMS, and national objectives and
policy, and it concentrates on developing balanced ship and aircraft
requirements for the eleventh fiscal year subsequent to its approval.
It considers technological potential and derives intermediate shipbuilding
and conversion goals to meet the requirements for year 11. Alternate
force goals are presented, justified, and the associated risks evaluated.
An upper level force structure and associated budget are derived from
desired effectiveness levels and technological constraints; a lower level
from fiscal and policy constraints.
Navy Support Plan (NSP) . This plan is based on approved Navy
forces, and estimates the total Navy structure for active and reserve
forces for years 1-9. Forces are described in terms of manpower,
ships, aircraft, organizational units and shore activities, providing a
basis to determine support requirements. One of its components, the
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Mobilization Manpower Allocation/Requirement Plan (M-MARP) dis-
cusses current readiness and mobilization capabilities, and objectives
for these characteristics in the future. NSP is prepared by the Director,
Logistics Plans Division under DCNO(Logistics).
Navy Capabilities Plan (NCP) . In support of the JSCP, the NCP
lists naval forces to be assigned to unified and specified commands,
assigns responsibilities for readiness and performance of operating
forces, and provides guidance for mobilization and logistics require-
ments. It is prepared by the Director, Strategic Plans Division,
DCNO (Plans and Policy).
Navy Program Objectives (PO). This document is prepared by
ACNO (General Planning & Programming), reviewed by CNO and CMC,
and approved and promulgated by SECNAV. It states annual increments
of balanced force levels required to achieve "objectives presented in
MRO; increments are in terms of DoD programming categories. PO
provides force structure input for JSOP, and guidance for developing
PCR's and reclamas to SECDEF force level decisions. Time periods
and other aspects of these primary planning documents are summarized
in Figure 1-10.
General Operational Requirements (GOR) . These are broad state-
ments of objectives for operational capabilities in years 5-15. They are
an important input to R&D planning, and serve as an invitation for acti-
vity submission of Proposed Technical Approaches (PTA). The GOR
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They are generally reviewed by DCNO's/ACNO's with comment from the
Director of Naval Intelligence, published in a single volume by CNO, and
reviewed as needed and annually. (OPNAV 3910. 9A, ref. C-15.)
Naval Research Objectives (NRO)
. CNR promulgates this general
statement of the need for studies in physical and life sciences to provide
information related to a solution of specific practical problems. It pro-
vides the structure for programming and budgeting the Navy's research
effort.
Exploratory Development Goals (EDG, formerly called Exploratory
Development Requirements). CND analyzes GOR's, MRO, NLRSS, and
the technological state-of-the-art, establishing the basis for initial
investigation required to advance technology in various functional areas.
(NAVMAT 3910.4, ref. C-10. )
Tentative Specific Operational Requirement (TSOR) . Prepared by
CNO and addressed to CNM or other cognizant office outside the NMSE,
the TSOR starts the process of defining a system--its characteristics
and specifications, and costs for R&D procurement, operation, and
maintenance. It is not a firm requirement and does not authorize the
start of a new development program. (OPNAV 3910. 6B ref. C-12).
Proposed Technical Approach (PTA). The PTA is prepared by
CNM or other cognizant office in response to a TSOR or GOR. It serves
as a basis for a decision on further development. It includes cost/time
and cost/performance trade-off analyses, and appraises technical risk,
reliability, maintainability, and support requirements.
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Advanced Development Objective (ADO)
.
If the PTA indicates the
existence of high technological, financial, or developmental risks, an
ADO is prepared by CNO to outline the areas requiring further study
prior to full-scale development.
Specific Operational Requirement (SOR). If the PTA does not indi-
cate unacceptable risk, CNO prepares an SOR for CNM or other cognizant
office specifying the operational capability desired. It is issued only
when inclusion of the expressed capability in the FYDP is probable.
Current capabilities and deficiencies in the area are discussed, and
requirements in terms of reliability and compatibility are stressed.
The SOR requires a response in the form of a Technical Develop-
ment Plan, and a decision as to whether the formal Contract Definition
phase will be required. Contract Definition (CD) will be initiated for
either (1) projects having cumulative RDT&E cost of more than $25
million, or (2) systems for which the production inventory costs are
expected to exceed $100 million, but CD may be initiated for other
projects as well. (The Contract Formulation (CF) and CD phases were
formerly called the Project Definition Phase (PDP). )
Technical Development Plan (TDP) . A TDP is a detailed documen-
tation of the actions, procedures, and resources required to achieve the
capability defined by an SOR, or the knowledge required by an ADO, and
may fill several hundred pages. It becomes an important management



















Narrative statement of requirement
Brief development plan
List of performance characteristics
List of reliability characteristics and plans to attain them
List of maintainability characteristics and plans to attain them
PERT/TIME diagram, or similar schedule






Operability and support plan
Test and evaluation plan
Personnel requirements and training plan
Production, delivery, and installation plan
A detailed format for the TDP presentation is specified in OPNAV
3910. 4B ref. C-ll. Due to the magnitude of the effort required for
and the volume of the TDP, it is frequently produced by an in-house
laboratory or contracted to industry, and the final report includes a
"TDP Summary" of information required by higher level management.
The TDP and summary are kept up-to-date and reflect approved PCR's.
If the CF/CD phase is required for the particular Engineering
Development or Operational System Development Project, the Navy and
contractors must exchange ideas on various aspects of the project's
feasibility. The Navy initiates the exchange with a Request for Proposal
(RFP) which includes requirements, results of previous studies, criteria
for proposal evaluation, and work schedules and documentation required
for CD. The contractors then submit their proposals, which include
lists of and specifications for required end items (including PERT net-
work) , a maintenance plan, cost estimates, time/cost/performance
trade offs, reliability specifications, technological approach and
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foreseeable problems, management techniques, proposals on specific
features of an incentive contract, and several other considerations of
import in conducting the engineering development. (SECNAV 3900. 33,
ref. C-9). A summary of the project growth and initiation process is
presented in Figure 1-11.
In contracting for research and exploratory development, the pro-
cedures are less elaborate. In-house capability is used whenever
practicable. Proposals, many of which are unsolicited, are reviewed
by persons competent in the particular technical field (generally from
ONR or the office of CND) for feasibility and reasonable practicality.
Larger projects require further feasibility and cost-effectiveness studies.
The R&D contracts require effective costing procedures and close and
continual evaluation of contractor progress and performance. (SECNAV
4200. 21, ref. C-22. )
The Navy has adopted formal, standardized reporting procedures to
augment the updated TDP's in facilitating a continual appraisal of the
existing R&D programs. They are designed to detect deviations from
planned performance, cost, and schedules, and to assess and update the
current validity of plans and requirements. The concept of "management
by exception" is employed, under which higher level management inter-
jects itself only into those situations requiring corrective action. The
action may involve requiring events to conform to existing plans, or
















DP Form 1498 Reporting System
. This form is used for reporting
in the planning stages and for work in progress; it replaced the DD
Form 613 system. It is used by the Navy Automated Research and
Development Information System (NARDIS), which is designed to store
for rapid retrieval specific management, scientific, and technical infor-
mation required by the Navy and by higher authority. The DD 1498 is
used at the RDT&E working levels: the element, the project, the task
area, and the work unit level. A copy of DD Form 1498 is included in
Appendix C. The NARDIS system is described in detail in ref. C-8.
RDT&E HOTLINE Report. This report is used by activity levels to
keep ASN(R&D) and DCNO(D) up-to-date on major advances or problems
that may seriously effect the RDT&E program; it is generally used only
for problems having a major effect on time, funds, technical develop-
ment, or personnel support. Other areas may be included if they are
expected to result in Presidential or SECDEF inquiry; e.g. , labor
relations, contractor relations, civic relations, small business , acci-
dents, or reduction in force considerations. Hotline reports are in
standard message format and are sent to DCNO(D) for action and ASN
(R&D) for information. They may be initiated by telephone, but must be
confirmed by message. For each project, the timing, funding, techni-
cal development, and personnel support problems are each assigned one
of the following subjective evaluations: good shape, minor weaknesses
(can be handled by bureau or office conducting the project), marginal,
major weaknesses (assistance required from outside the office, but from
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within the Navy), or critical ( the Navy must seek outside assistance;
e.g., from OSD, other services / or Congress). (OPNAV 3910.13, ref.
C-17. )
Research and Exploratory Development Program Highlights . This
document presents a summary of breakthroughs and problems from the
Program 6 categories "Research" and "Exploratory Development" only;
the other reports are used for Advanced Development, Engineering
Development, and Operational Systems Development. Reports are sub-
mitted on an exception basis; there need not be a report on every project
every month. This reflects the fact that work in these two categories
does not generally lend itself to exact cost and time scheduling basis.
The problems to be included are those which are expected to require
changes in the time, cost, or personnel support required for completion,
a redirection of emphasis or approach, and major achievements or
failure to meet milestones. As in the HOTLINE report, events expected
to be of Presidential or SECDEF interest may also be included. While
message format is not used, the reports are to be concise, specific,
and factual; opinions if included must be clearly identified as such.
Monthly Project Evaluation . This report is required every month
for all Advanced Development, Engineering Development, and Opera-
tional Systems Development projects. The information in the report is
plotted against the TDP planning data to keep ASN(R&D) and DCNO(D)
up-to-date. Copies are also sent to other offices of CNO, the Manage-
ment Information Center, and the Office of the Navy Comptroller.
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The primary considerations are timing, funding, technical problems,
personnel support, and reliability. The report is brief--only one page--
and the information required is well designed to assist management.
The entries are summarized below:
Overall Evaluation: milestones, funds, technical develop-
ment, personnel support, and reliability all rated on
the same basis as described under the HOTLINE report
Subsystem Evaluation: subsystems rated in the same manner
RDT&E Fund Changes: expected changes from last approved
FYDP, with explanation for change
Remarks: explanation of all items not rated as in "good shape"
Project Highlights: major breakthroughs or new capabilities;
milestones achieved this month, estimate of operational
date, and personnel training plan required
Quarterly Project Reliability Summary . These reports are required
only on projects in the Engineering Development and Operational Systems
Development categories. They serve as a reliability annex to the TDP
summary by providing minimum acceptable reliability requirements and
project reliability goals; they also serve as quarterly progress reports
for top management. The reliability summary is in terms of approved
minimum acceptable reliability requirements, contracted reliability
goals, predicted reliability, and achieved reliability; the data is given
for subsystems and for the overall systems reliability. The report
concludes with notes on the basis for the reliability figures and confi-
dence levels presented. The report is largely quantitative, with
sufficient notes to explain the figures presented.
Several evaluation aids not in the report form are used by manage-
ment in keeping track of projects in the program. The Monthly Project
52
Evaluation Reports are summarized with the Research and Exploratc
Development Highlights for a Monthly Summary Analysis, primarily by
the Development Planning Division under DCNO(D). Each Monday,
except for the first Monday of the month, ASN.(R&D), DCNO(D), and
senior representatives from CNM and the Bureaus assemble to review
selected projects; all projects are reviewed twice annually and those
in difficulty more often. Program Status Books are maintained for
ASN(R&D), DCNO(D), and ACNO(D), containing current pertinent
information from the TDP's.
In response to previous difficulties in meeting schedules and costs,
the SECDEF MEMO of 16 August 1961 was issued. This memorandum is
aimed at eliminating the bias of meeting specific system or hardware
requirements at all costs, and replacing that bias with a more effective
evaluation of trade offs of requirements with completion time and total
project cost. It states that technical feasibility is not in itself justifica-
tion for a weapon systems or equipment development, but that the system
must be designed to meet a recognized military need. DoD and the
services retain responsibility for reviewing and evaluating the trade
offs, but contractors are encouraged to present alternative requirements
to reduce cost and speed development. (OPNAV 3910. 8A, ref. C-14.)
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Chapter 2. RDT&E Management vs. Uncertainty
It is estimated that 100, 000 persons a year, whose principal
responsibility it is to make judgments as inputs to the deci-
sion process, lose their jobs; most of these persons have
probably been replaced by algorithms. ^2
The managers of research and development programs are confronted
at every decision with uncertainty. The uncertainty comes from a variety
of sources: the changing political-military situation, definition of objec-
tives and requirements, the alternatives available and their utility, cost,
reliability, and time requirements, the best mix of alternatives to
achieve a balanced program, the magnitude of the overall R&D effort
required to make the most efficient contribution, and whether Congress
will approve the funds requested.
The managers have the responsibility for providing the new equips
ment, technology, and procedures to improve the organization's ability
to meet current commitments and to ensure the capability for meeting
future commitments. This requires first that the managers be familiar
with existing commitments, capabilities, and problems. To do this in
general terms is not an unreasonably difficulty task; but do so with the
detail and precision required to make use of conventional mathematical
resource allocation techniques is very difficult. Extending the problem
five, ten, or twenty years into the future--as the R&D managers must-
tends to transform a difficult problem into chaos. To prevent that chaos




Sources of Uncertainty .
The mission of the organization is a reasonable starting point for
seeking a solution to the R&D manager's problem. A general statement
of the purpose of the organization is usually available, but it must be
divided into more specific objectives to be useful. The next step is to
evaluate projects by their contribution to the organization's objectives.
For example, the Navy would consider such things as the relative con-
tributions of carrier strike aircraft and Polaris submarines to Program
I, Strategic Forces. This evaluation requires an analysis of the current
and projected political situation, and is most often done in developing a
scenario. But most aspects of the future must remain uncertain no
matter how thorough the analysis. There is no intent to discredit a
careful study of this phase of the problem. It is simply observed that
long-range plans must be based on possible rather than certain events.
The XB-70 program is a spectacular example of what can happen when
a threat and requirement are re-evaluated. Approximately $1. 5 billion
was spent for development before the requirement for the aircraft was
33
ultimately ruled invalid.
Once the scenario(s) is established, the objectives are then evaluated
and "reasonable" estimates of requirements made. Even if there were
no doubt about the events in the scenario, the requirements could not be




do not have a reliability of 100% and the exact value of their reliability
is not known in advance. Another compromise with reality must be
made, and the manager must deal with the particular force level that
can probably do the job required by the scenario. These remarks apply
even if the analysis is made using available and tested hardware.
Evaluation of proposed systems introduces more problems. A
search for alternative projects is made and then each proposal must be
studied to determine whether the project can develop a successful pro-
duct or system, what characteristics the new system will possess, how
much it will cost to develop, produce, operate and maintain the system,
and how long it will take to acquire an operational system. The manager
needs information on cost/effectiveness and cost/time trade offs.
Procedures for making estimates of these characteristics and quantities
are improving, but a large measure of uncertainty remains.
Various combinations of proposals and current projects must be
studied in formulating the complete R&D program, thus further com-
pounding the problem. The interactions between projects cause numerous
difficulties. Even in the case of existing hardware, the decision as to
whether $100 of A and $200 of B is more effective than $200 of A and
$100 of B must often be a subjective one. Measuring the relative mili-
tary worth of various systems is an area of utility theory which, for all
of the quantitative techniques that have been applied or suggested,
remains imprecise. Measures of the return on R&D effort are very
difficult to obtain. Many studies have given up on that portion of the
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problem altogether, and merely assume that output is directly propor-
tional to input for all projects. With that assumption, "optimal"
allocation of research personnel, funds, and facilities becomes highly
suspect.
When the manager must deal with research projects that attempt to
increase the general store of knowledge in various areas, his problems
are multiplied. In the preceding discussions of development projects,
the end items of the R&D effort were reasonably well defined. But in
basic research, not only does the manager lack information on the cost,
duration, and probability of success of projects, but he does not know
what useful output will be obtained, if any!
The next problem in conducting an R&D program is reserved for the
program's top management, with sympathy. The full spectrum of
uncertainty combines with the difficulties of measuring returns on
research and development investment to greatly complicate the decision
of how to allocate expenditures between basic research projects, long-
range development projects, and rapid-return development projects.
This dilemma probably accounts for the frequent criticisms of current
R&D programs in both civilian and military organizations as being
biased toward those development projects expected to give the quickest
results. These same difficulties complicate the higher level decision
of how much money to allocate to the total R&D program in relation to
the other major programs.
Even when the Navy and DoD arrive at what they feel to be the best
R&D program, there remains another element of uncertainty: they do
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not know whether Congress will approve the funds necessary to carry-
out that program. The Congressional decision is influenced by inter-
national politics and the cold-war situation, national growth rates,
unemployment, trends toward inflation or recession, and political
log-rolling.
The R&D manager's problems are complex and wrought with frus-
trations. In reference to the opening quote of this chapter, it would
appear that very few of those decision-makers being replaced by algo-
rithms will be involved in R&D management. But to ignore modern
management techniques and fly entirely by the seat of the pants is to
lose sight of the purpose of those techniques. The techniques are not
designed to make the decisions; they are designed to put complex
problems into a manageable form to give the decision-maker a handle
on the uncertainty and risk involved, the scheduling and funding
requirements, and the range of potential returns on investments.
Well-formulated mathematical models can be no more accurate or
reliable than the assumptions and data that go into them. The same
is true of the decision-maker to a lesser degree, but the experienced
manager can evaluate details and aspects of the problem that are
omitted from mathematical models. The model should be designed to
provide an optimal solution if it is available, but in the more common
instances an optimal solution cannot be defined quantitatively. The
model should make flying by the seat of the pants a more stable evolu-
tion.
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Organizing for Research and Development
It is obviously not possible to summarize here everything that has
been said about organization structures, policies, and techniques, nor
is it intended. But there are some observations concerning the types
of organization structure that have been used in research and develop-
ment activities and some established management policies that should
be considered in conducting research and development. The magnitude
and extent of the uncertainty inherent in the R&D process demand the
best management techniques available. The time required to establish
a broad and complete data base to reduce the uncertainty is a luxury
that cannot be afforded. Planning procedures must be developed which
can account for present uncertainty and which can be easily modified to
accept more accurate data. This section suggests and discusses some
such management procedures.
Several different approaches for organizing the R&D function of
corporations have been tried and tested in practice. Industry has not
arrived at any single structure as being generally the best; the differ-
ent structures have their own advantages and disadvantages which must
be evaluated against the type of research to be conducted. The Ameri-
can Management Association sponsored a study of R&D organization





Subject/Discipline Structure. Organizing the R&D function accord-
ing to subject is a useful technique when much of the work can be readily
assigned to the subject areas; it is done in the Office of Naval Research.
It facilitates coordination and communication within the subject area,
and makes it easier for the scientists and engineers to keep abreast of
new developments in their field. It provides flexibility and comparative
ease of assigning both priorities and personnel, and in shifting them as
necessary. Project selection may be made with more complete know-
ledge of the "alternatives. Continuity of research is enhanced, and
greater advantage is taken of learning curve benefits. The character-
istics which produce these advantages become detriments when the
organization must undertake mult i- discipline projects. An additional
difficulty which occurs even without the mult i- discipline problems is the
tendency toward narrow outlooks resulting from overspecialization.
Product/Type Structure . This type of breakdown is more commonly
found in the development end of the spectrum, where multi-discipline
problems are the rule. For large organizations, the product type may
be subdivided on a subject basis; the net result is a series of line units
organized on a product basis, supported by staffs from the required
subject areas. This requires great flexibility of personnel assignment. .
The project/type structure groups the necessary people together in a
team to conduct a coordinated attack on particular problem types, and
develops a set of technical information and solution techniques. It makes
it more difficult for scientists and engineers to keep current in their
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fields. It also raises objections from scientists and engineers because
of the need to shift personnel between products, allegedly creating feel-
ings of insecurity and uncertainty.
Project/Problem Structure . One of the most frequently employed
structuring techniques for multi-disciplinary work is to form problem-
solving teams within a laboratory or other organizational unit. It
provides stimulating interaction between scientists and engineers. The
periodic shifting of personnel is considered to be an advantage when it
can be done within the lab, thus eliminating major readjustment for the
individual. Its other advantages and disadvantages are similar to those
discussed under the product structure.
Stage/Phase Structure . Division of the organization along the R&D
spectrum is often made at the top levels of the R&D organization to
group functions with similar uncertainty characteristics. Each of the
broad categories is then subdivided using one of the three structures
presented above. This broad division has the disadvantage of compli-
cating transfer of knowledge- -and problems--from one phase to another,
In terms of the Navy's R&D efforts, the phase structure is used in
placing Research under the control of CNR, Exploratory Development
under CND, and Advanced, Engineering and Operational Systems
Development under DCNO(D). The subject structure is used within
ONR. Analysis of the development effort is more difficult. The
research and development offices within CNM and other organizations
have a line responsibility in conducting R&D and a staff function in
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using R&D to support the mission of their particular activity. Develop-
ment is structured on what is, roughly speaking, a product basis; e. g,
ships, weapons, or medicine and surgery. Within each Bureau or
major office, the organization of the development effort is structured
once again, this time on more of a problem basis.
The Navy also uses the project/problem structure for special
projects of high priority as selected by the Secretary of the Navy. The
use of project management has received some severe criticism from
Navy sources in spite of its demonstrated success in the development
of the Polaris-FBM system. It has a tendency to siphon off the elite
management talent for special projects, leaving the rest of the R&D
program in less-experienced hands. Its increased use was cited by
Rear Admirals Brockett and Curtze as one of the reasons for their
early retirement from the Bureau of Ships, because it was undermining
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the importance of their functions in the Bureau. It may be that the
Navy is misusing a good thing by placing project management outside of
the control of Bureau Chiefs. It is probable that if the Bureau Chiefs
and CNM were given the authority to use project management at their
own discretion, many of the same problems would generally be desig-
nated special projects and the system would function more smoothly.
Then if a high priority were deemed necessary, SECNAV approval
could be solicited.
3
B-56, pp 20, 25.
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Another important management consideration is the degree of
centralization or decentralization which should be built into the organi-
zation. It is again difficult to make definite conclusions in favor of one
extreme or the other. The policies followed by the American Cyanamid
of.
Company in this area indicate the nature of the problem, and are
described in this paragraph. Initially the company employed a decen-
tralized and loosely coordinated R&D structure, with each division
operating nearly independently. Communications were informal and
sporadic; ".
.
.the inevitable duplication actually stimulated some
effective internal competition, but more often the results were less
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than favorable. " In 1954, all research programs were centralized
and work on each product was consolidated in one location. A coopera-
tive spirit was generated within each product group, but the managers
of operating divisions no longer felt any direct responsibility for
research and development, and the research activities lacked commer-
cial guidance, e.g.
,
in estimating market potentials. The company
decided to return the R&D function to managers of the operating divisions,
making them responsible for both the current and future operations of
their units. Other companies have undergone similar transitions, but






At the risk of oversimplifying the problem it may be viewed as a
trade off between the efficiencies of conducting R&D in a centralized
location, and the problems of communicating the needs and problems
of the operating forces and the potential of the research activity. The
Navy weights the trade off in favor of the decentralized structure, but
retains some of the advantages and disadvantages of both types. First,
the Navy has the mission of contributing to the defense of the nation and
its principles. It must have a centralized structure to be prepared to
carry out its duties in wartime. On the other hand, top-level manage-
ment does not have the time to oversee every detailed evolution; it
must set up and promulgate objectives, and to a lesser extent, proce-
dures, and then delegate authority to carry out action as necessary to
meet the objectives. The usual emphasis on procedures is directed
primarily at administrative standardization; when it aims at specifying
exactly how every operation should be carried out, it tends to generate
such a large volume of reading material that it is self-defeating.
The planning documents discussed in Chapter 1 are a step toward
specifying objectives. The documents should be promulgated to all the
people who could benefit from their availability. The Navy policy of
"management by exception" is an indication of the trend toward decen-
tralization; activities function independently once their course of
action has been agreed upon, and higher levels need act only when events
deviate from the plan. This policy is acceptable as long as top manage-
ment participates actively in promulgating objectives and formulating
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the initial plans for meeting the objectives. The decentralization is
desirable to the extent that it frees top manag ement for top-level deci-
sions, but it can be effective only to the extent that all levels are
familiar with the organization's objectives, capabilities, and problems.
This is primarily a communications problem. The combination of
decentralization and poor communications prevents timely decisions
38
and prompt implementation.
Closely related to centralization/decentralization considerations
is the problem of selecting appropriate decision levels; i. e.
,
deter-
mining who is best qualified to make which decisions. It seems logical
that the managers of the activities actually conducting the R&D and the
scientists and engineers themselves would be in the best position to
decide which projects to undertake and how to carry them out. This
theory is advocated by many managers and management science text
authors. The thory runs into difficulty finding people who actually
perform R&D and have a good feel for the objectives, requirements,
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and problems of the organization. This emphasizes the importance
of top management keeping all levels informed of objectives, require-





B-50, pp 74. From a presentation by F. L. Ashworth, USN,
Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Naval Weapons for RDT&E, to the
Sixteenth National Conference on the Administration of Research,
September 1962.
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A wealth of material has been written about personnel administra-
tion in R&D. Much of it centers about two stereotyped characters: the
wizened, bespectacled scientist, obsessed with his specialized specialty,
and violently opposed to everything that the other character stands for;
the other character is the miss-placed Prussian style R&D manager,
issuing orders in great volume and detail concerning matters about
which he knows little, and intent upon persecution of the scientist.
While this is an obvious overstatement of conditions, it is worthwhile
to look at the problems which give rise to these impressions.
The research workers need an environment of academic freedom,
in which creativity and initiative are encouraged. They resent being
told exactly what they must do, and appreciate a choice in what they do
and how they do it. There are many talented people in this business
and they are capable of making a contribution to the planning function.
But in order to take advantage of that capability, the managers must
expose the scientists and engineers to the problems of the organization,
attempt to interest them in the problems, and maintain that interest and
enthusiasm for the duration of the project. On the other hand, the
research workers must recognize the manager's problem of limited
time, money facilities, and organization interests. An atmosphere of
team work and cooperation is as essential in R&D as in any other field.
The interests of management and the scientists regarding flexibility
of personnel assignment and temporary transfers are also discordant.
This is a subjective consideration that must be made by management
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in allocating personnel and shifting their assignments.
In scheduling work for a particular R&D activity, the manager
should keep in mind Parkinson's law that "work expands to fit the time
available for its completion." As a group nears completion of a project,
the manager should have another project waiting. His attention to the
transition to the new project can pay great dividends in time saved.




An organizational institution which must be included because of its
extensive use is the committee. It has been said that a camel is a
horse that was put together by a committee. The primary objections
to committees are that they permit a diffusion of responsibility and
lack of accountability; they are conservative in that resulting action
is reduced to the lowest common denominator of agreement; and they
41
tend to delay and stifle action. They exist, in spite of the drawbacks,
because it is frequently necessary to consult people in different activi-
ties about new developments or brief them on new problems or policies
which require study by persons trained in disciplines not grouped
together any where in the organization structure. They serve as an
aid to communications in bridging the gaps between divisions of the
organization.
40




Communications in the R&D Organization .
The need for effective two-way communications has already been
stressed in terms of communicating organization objectives and prob-
lems, and the capabilities and potential of the R&D activities. It can
be readily seen in the exchange of ideas involved in the planning process
described in Chapter 1. It is essential to effective control of work in
progress. If progress reports are not timely and accurate, the
decision-making process must suffer. In a study of information flow
in ONR, it was observed that "the bulk of the information actually
flowing into the program management decisions is not formal, docu-
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mented information. " The extensive use of informal and personal
communications is not a fault in itself, but in the interests of accuracy
and obtaining a sound basis for decisions, it must be followed up by
more formal documentation. The written project description and
information becomes especially critical when a project progresses to
the point of more detailed development; without it, much unnecessary
duplication of effort is likely. The degree of decentralization in the
Navy R&D structure requires a large volume of information transfer.
The final reports on studies made by CNA and other activities, and
the TDP's compiled by offices in the NMSE and by contractors present
another communications problem. The reports and TDP's are usually
42
B-60, pp 53. Quoted from the "Phase I Report, Information
Flow at the Office of Naval Research, " pp III-2.
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very long, and the reports, particularly, are often written to manage-
ment rather than for management. The originator relies heavily on
the oral briefing to assist management in understanding the written
presentation. The contractor-originated documents are designed to
sell, and the manager must probe beneath the salesmanship to deter-
mine the value of the proposal. There is a tendency of the analysts to
become so fascinated with their model that they may lose sight of the
43problem solution that they are trying to present. Computer programs
are often included without adequate description and explanation, and if
the program is an essential portion of the study the manager has a
very difficult time familiarizing himself with the abbreviations and
quantities used in order to discover what is actually going on in the
program.
The assumptions employed in the analysis determine the validity,
interpretation, and applicability of the results. Unfortunately the
as sumptions --if stated at all-- are sprinkled throughout the report
rather than collected for easy review and evaluation. The effect of
the assumptions on the results should be discussed in the report.
There are numerous lists of the proper ingredients of these reports.
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(1) purpose(s) of the study
(2) definition and brief description of the system
(3) type 6f costing techniques used (and source of data if
applicable)
(4) costs excluded
(5) discounting technique used (if any)
(6) time phasing of project
(7) restrictions and limitations
All of the analytical portions of a report should be described and pre-
sented in such a way as to permit evaluation of the project effort after
its completion. This phase of management has received relatively
little attention, and the bulk of the post-operational evaluation that has
been done has been more concerned with the data itself than with the
way it was acquired and utilized. Even the data has been difficult to
assemble because of changes in schedules, changes in measuring tech-
niques, and changes in the item being developed. This problem should
be recognized and eliminated by more careful presentations. The Navy
report forms are relatively new and most of them are revised as
management uses the reports and gets a better feel for what information
is required. They are improving, but a review of the entire reporting
system for consistency, redundancy, and omissions would be helpful.
Another type of communications problem results from the wealth
of technical literature being published, a problem that is being aggra-
vated by the attempt to measure scientific output by the volume of
published material. This greatly magnifies the difficulty of keeping
up-to-date on the latest developments in a particular field. The problem
can be partially solved by allowing time for reading by both the research
workers and managers, by providing the pertinent literature and
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abstracts, and by utilizing the Defense Documentation Center. But this
may not be sufficient. It may be advantageous in the long run to provide
an R&D information service which would maintain a subject listing of
articles and reports, compare the listing with activity interests and
their current and scheduled projects, and provide a printout of the
literature of probable interest to each activity. Since "gaps" of any
sort arouse concern in a near-magical fashion, the importance of this
problem may be best emphasized as the need to close the ACTION GAP
--the painfully slow decision process of transforming scientific achieve-
45
ment into useful products.
An information theory study of the rate of transmission of informa-
tion throughout the Navy RDT&E community is another project that would
no doubt prove interesting. The problem of the distribution of the infor-
mation- -getting information to the people who need it and sparing those
who are not concerned- -also deserves study. The manager's span of
control (the number of his direct subordinates) should theoretically be
kept small (about 4 or 5) to permit the manager to properly control and
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communicate with his subordinates, but this adds to the decision
levels ef the organization and makes vertical communications much
more difficult. Management must decide where it can best control the






The organization and communications problems are intimately-
related. The manager requires information on operational problems
and research potential to produce the objectives and plans that the
research personnel need for guidance. Another exchange of information
is required in developing ideas into products that assist in fulfilling plans
and meeting objectives. Additional communications are necessary
between the Research, Exploratory Development, Advanced, and
Engineering and Operational Systems Development categories to pro-
vide cooperation and mutual support. Research personnel require
external information to keep abreast of the latest developments in their
fields. They must use effective communications in reporting their
work so that management may recognize its implications, convert the
results into production items, and evaluate the analytical and mana-
gerial techniques that went into the research and development project.
Brief and concise reports are helpful to the managers and to the rest
of the R&D community.
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Chapter 3. The Initial Planning Process
We have passed through the age of random creativeness
and are entering the age of deliberate creativeness.
In promoting deliberate creativeness, it is necessary to gather
information and thoughts to build a base for deciding what directions
creativity is to take. A realistic evaluation of current threats, com-
mitments
,
and capabilities must be made. An attempt must be made
to predict future threats and commitments and the ability of current
and project forces to meet them must be evaluated. The conclusions
must be studied in the light of broad national and organizational policy
and objectives, and transformed into more specific objectives. This
must be followed by a thorough search for alternative means of achiev-
ing the objectives. The alternatives should undergo an initial screening




The procedures for conducting the planning and study outlined
above already exist and have been described in Chapter 1. The portion
that deals with evaluating current capabilities --the starting point in
constructing a scenario- -receives little emphasis. It is certainly
47
B-48, pp 23. E. P. Stevenson citing a previous conference
speaker, Dr. Maurice Nelles.
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reasonable to assume that the top DoD and Navy officials are familiar
with the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of their organizations
and that they consider these in formulating long-, medium-, and
short-range plans. The program/budget requests submitted to
Congress, modified to reflect Congressional changes and the resultant
service changes, should be a useful document for this review. Current
policy and short-range projections are available from the President's
State of the Union presentation, the legislative and executive review of
the Defense budget, the Secretary of Defense program/budget decisions,
and other sources.
Future threats and commitments are frequently addressed by
extensive long-range studies conducted by the Institute of Naval Studies
(INS) in CNA. These studies attempt to define and resolve political
issues, predict their effect, and assess their military implications.
The extent to which the INS studies are compared with similar studies
conducted by DoD and the State Department is not clear. The Navy
should be responsible for evaluating the implications of the studies
for naval warfare, and it is entitled to its own opinions on the other
aspects of the studies, but it does seem desirable to determine the
differences between Navy-originated predictions and those of other
offices. This type of comparison could help to explain and resolve
some of the differences of opinion that appear months later in budget
proposals.
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In presenting the estimate of the threat and evaluating its military
implications, a year -by-year breakdown would be most useful. By
including intelligence reports and estimates of the enemy research
and development capability, this type of presentation facilitates the
planning of our own efforts and the assigning of values to our effort.
The timing of R&D projects is a very difficult process. Estimates of
project completion have been notoriously inaccurate, and the errors
have almost always been in underestimating. Any information that can
be developed to guide the timing of R&D projects would be a major
contribution to planning the allocation of effort.
The primary considerations in the scenario involve the prospects
of nuclear and limited war, shifting alliances, and trends in the
behavior of under -developed countries; these must be studied in great
detail. But non-politico/military topics such as national manpower
availability, scarcity of resources, and technological advances are
also important. The research and development community should
provide the technology predictions. In addition tohelping formulate
long-range plans, they would be stretching their own horizons. The
latter would help balance the natural tendency to weight the R&D effort
heavily in favor of short-range, quick-return projects.
Plans and Objectives.
Using the evaluation of current capabilities and policies, the
scenario and the broad national and organizational objectives, the
planning process described in Chapter 1 is carried out as a continuous
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task, and the scenario must also be updated as major changes in the
political situation occur. The plans are officially updated at least
once a year, but the process cannot be geared entirely to a one-shot
annual review. In developing the plans, probable enemy response to
our actions must be considered; the current anti-ballistic missile
quandry is an excellent example. It is advantageous to anticipate this
sort of problem and have well -formulated alternative courses of action
prepared.
It is interesting to note the interplay between the planning docu-
ments discussed as separate entities in Chapter 1. Figure 3-1 displays
some of the interactions and may help bring the activities discussed in
this chapter into perspective. The plans are clearly not independent;
they build from current capabilities in the directions indicated by the
broad objectives and the scenario, and lead to the formulation of more
specific objectives. The MRO specifically plans in terms of an upper
level of effectiveness with technological constraints and a lower level
of effectiveness with expected budgetary constraints. General recogni-
tion of both constraints is apparent in other documents as well.
The formulation of the more specific objectives is essential.
Implicit goals lead to inconsistency, lack of coordination, and unavoid-
48
able suboptimization. The objectives would be most useful if expressed
as desired capabilities. This would provide the research and develop-








































SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS \
TO MEET OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS J
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freedom in seeking alternatives, as well as a responsibility to conduct
a thorough and imaginative search for those alternatives. But a simple
list of desired capabilities and objectives is not enough to enable the
R&D managers to efficiently guide the efforts of their activities. It is
not reasonable to assume that all of the objectives in such a list are
equally important: "... goals.
. .




There have been many attempts in utility theory to transform the
subjective evaluation conducted by managers into some sort of quanti-
tative or qualitative preference relationships. "Reference gambles"
are sometimes used to develop dollar values for sets of objectives or
capabilities, and several other techniques are being studied. But for
purposes of this presentation, the most suitable approach is to require
top-level management to provide a numerical weighting of the impor-
tance of objectives to approximate their subjective evaluation. This
attempt to quantitatively reproduce the subjective judgments applied
by management is better adapted to the formulation of the problem
than procedures such as the reference gamble. A check should be
made on the manager's approximate quantitative values to ensure
transitivity; i.e., ifA=»B, and B>C, thenA=»C.
A deficiency of most mathematical techniques applied to the




require independence of objectives. The independence requirement
may be met by combining dependent objectives into groups of indepen-
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dent aggregate objectives. But in most of the problems of interest,
the number of interdependencies would require such a high level of
aggregation as to make the problem unmanageable.
For example, in the problem of selecting an "optimal" deterrent
force, Polaris, Minuteman, and B-52's may be among the alterna-
tives. By questioning experienced officers in the Navy and Air Force,
it may be possible to assign relative weights to the effectiveness
of each missile: Polaris = 10, Minuteman = 15, and B-52 = 5. If
the assumption of independence of effectiveness is made, the total
effectiveness of 90 Polaris missiles, 100 Minutemen, and 54 B-52's
is (90) x (10) + (100) x (15) + (54) x (5) = 900 + 1500 + 270 = 2670.
Are 10 Polaris missiles 10 times as effective as 1? Or 5 times, or
20 times as effective? Only if the effectiveness of each missile is
independent of each other missile can their effectiveness be added
directly. Can equivalent forces be composed of 2670/5 = 267
Polaris missiles, 2670/15 = 178 Minutemen, or 2670/5 = 534 B-52's?
If it is reasoned that the enemy must deploy a more extensive and
expensive defense in coping with a mix of the weapons, then the





If the weighting of objectives can reasonably be achieved at the
top levels of the organization, subsequent levels of management will
then have a very helpful frame of reference for evaluating their objec-
tives. The more specific objectives derived at each level can be
evaluated on their contribution to higher level goals. This "subjective
quantification" is not very precise, but with the abundance and magni-
tude of uncertainty that must be dealt with in approaching R&D
problems, the lack of precision- -while desirable- -is not critical.
The search for means of objective quantification sometimes
introduces the behavioral concept that implies "objective is to rational
as subjective is to irrational"- -a most un-objective contention. There
are a great many successful managers that rely on their own subjective
judgments every day, and it is unlikely that they have been successful
because they have behaved irrationally.
Even when the above sequential weighting of objectives has
been performed, the R&D manager's problem of allocation of effort
has not been completely solved. The allocation of effort is a function
of the importance of the objectives and the relative efficiency of
research in various subject areas. The inclusion of efficiency brings
up the difficult problem of measuring the returns on research once
again. That discussion will be postponed to later chapters.
Search for Alternatives .
Up to this point, the current situation has been evaluated, a
scenario constructed, general plans formulated, and specific
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objectives derived and weighted. The next step is to conduct a thorough
and extensive search for alternate methods of achieving the objectives.
This responsibility and its full recognition by the R&D community are
essential to the entire program. The search for alternatives must
include a thorough search of the topic literature. Much effort can be
wasted in the name of creativity and originality if the effort is not
preceded by collecting information on what has already been done.
This tendency is most pronounced in model-building analyses where
not long ago it was possible to embark on a project with a very high
probability of coming up with an original result. The high volume of
unorganized literature makes the search process a difficult one even
when undertaken conscientiously.
The search for alternatives is an area where considerable improve-
ment may be possible for a small expenditure of effort. There are
many potential sources of proposals. They may originate as specific
suggestions from top management or lower level managers, although
the managers tend to shy away from being specific in making their
proposals because they do not want to deprive the scientists and
engineers of academic freedom. There has been some criticism of
the services in the past for having told their study groups and R&D
organization what to prove, invent, and develop, down to the last
minute detail, and the present attitude may be an over-correction.
The top levels of Navy management could suggest very specific ideas
to be included in the full set of alternatives under consideration at the
appropriate activity for achieving a particular capability, thus provid-
ing the benefits of its experience without unduly restricting academic
freedom.
The operating forces constitute a largely untapped source of pro-
posals for areas requiring study or corrective action and for possible
approaches to the problem. The proposed alternatives from the fleet
become more and more effective as the training level of officers is
increased through postgraduate study. The Navy has a tendency to rely
heavily on its transfer of personnel from ships to particular shore
billets to provide the input from operating forces to the R&D process.
While the rotation system does contribute to communications, it is not
an efficient means of obtaining information for timely decisions. There
are other means currently used to obtain a fleet information input;
e.g.
,
through the Navy Research and Development Review Board and
the Beneficial Suggestion policy of BuShips. But the former is not
likely to have time to review a very wide range of alternatives; its
review must be performed after a considerable amount of selection
and rejection has been completed. The Beneficial Suggestions are too
restrictive to support the wide range of subjects in the R&D program.
It appears desirable to have the operating forces provide proposals
of problem areas and possible solutions. (Solutions would not have to
accompany problem descriptions. ) This would be one means of obtain-
ing a higher return on the Navy's training investment, and could
stimulate a healthy concern not only for keeping the ships running for
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another day, but for substantial long-range improvements as well. For
example, a gunnery officer on a destroyer which has recently partici-
pated in numerous shore-bombardment assignments may talk to the
Marines they were supporting, and conclude that perhaps naval guns--
little used for their designed purpose of shiprto-ship combat--could be
modified or replaced to achieve a more effective shore-bombardment
capability. The Commanding Officer of the destroyer might be sold on
the idea after a wardroom discussion, and a brief description of the
proposal could be sent off to the clearinghouse for consideration. Thus
an idea which might otherwise easily have retired with two or three
officers may become a valuable addition to the Navy's capability.
In the interest of rapid communications, it would be desirable to
submit the proposals directly to a designated clearinghouse rather
than through the entire chain of command. The clearinghouse should
provide consolidation and screening services of Navy personnel,
scientists, and engineers. This would spare the operating forces'
chain of command from an excessive addition to their already substan-
tial paper -shuffling load. The clearinghouse should specifically not
be required to explain and describe their disposition of proposals to the
originators, although recognitions of exceptional proposals would be
desirable.
If it is desirable to obtain from the operating forces a wider range
of opinions on proposals, this should be done on a "copy to the chain of
command" basis. Highly formalized structure and format for the
procedure are undesirable. Endorsements from the chain of command
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need be no more than a legible "forwarded, " or brief comments such
as "looks good" or "would cause problem x, " but more detailed com-
ments or additional alternatives could also be appended.
The greatest number of proposals originates in the R&D community,
where most of the Navy's scientific and engineering talent is located.
The -Clearinghouse discussed above may be best located in the same
place to take advantage of that talent. The specific location is a more
difficult problem. Sections III, IV, and VI of the Office of Naval
Research constitute one possibility; the office of DCNM(D)/CND and
the office of DCNO(D) are others. In the process of soliciting propo-
sals from the operating forces it would be possible to define categories
of proposals to be directed to each of these offices. The boundaries
between the categories of the R&D program are not well defined and a
knowledge of what has been and is being done in each area is required
to accurately determine the proper address for a proposal, and the
operating forces are not likely to have this detailed knowledge. It may
be desirable in the long run to add one more office in spite of the
disadvantages of increasing the size of the organization.
Another major source of proposals is external to the Navy: the
universities, non-profit research institutions, and industry. Nearly
all of the university research supported by ONR results from unsolicited
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Research Objectives, Exploratory Development Goals, or Requests
for Proposals, depending on the R&D category. The possibility of
providing universities with lists of subjects based on some of the
alternative proposals collected by the clearinghouses warrants investi-
gation. A very brief list is available at the Naval Postgraduate School
to students in the Operations Analysis curriculum under the title
"Suggested Thesis Topics. " This approach could prove helpful in
narrowing the list of alternatives requiring in-house study and Navy
financing. Industry is even more susceptible to a similar approach.
The research activities attempt to interest companies in undertaking
preliminary studies in subject areas related to the company products
in the hopes of landing a substantial follow-up contract. Some "seed
money" is available for this type of preliminary work without the usual
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requirement for formal advertising. The proposals answered by the
universities may provide an indirect recruitment program for Navy
in-house labs as well.
In the context of the existing organization, the offices designated
as proposal clearinghouses should consolidate proposals according to
subjects and eliminate those proposals which are obviously undesir-
able, unsafe, technologically infeasible, or which would create more
problems than they would solve. The undesirable, unsafe, or problem-
generating proposals may be discarded permanently. The technologically
infeasible proposals may be collected at ONR or the office of CND for
5
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further evaluation. If they appear to offer a substantial contribution to
the organization's objectives, they may be included at some future date
in the appropriate research or exploratory development program area.
The transfer of a proposal for technologically infeasible hardware
to the research or exploratory development categories is only one of
several exchanges of information between categories. The results of
completed basic and applied research must be transmitted to the
exploratory development category for evaluation and possible inclusion
in the set of alternatives, and similarly for completed projects in each
successive category. If a major problem is encountered or at least
foreseen in the engineering or operational systems development cate-
gories, the entire project may be designated as an advanced development
project by existing procedures. Similar (but not necessarily formal)
transfer procedures are necessary to permit problems encountered in
any development category to be passed backwards through the system
for evaluation and possible solution. The ability to attain a flexible
and timely mutual support capability between categories is essential to
the R&D process. The need for timeliness of this support and of all
communications required in the initial planning phase is emphasized




The initial phase of formulating and conducting the R&D program
was described projecting national and organizational objectives, current
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capabilities, and technological advances into a scenario to devise
plans, requirements, and specific objectives for achieving the Navy's
mission. The requirements and objectives generate a very large
number of alternative proposals and problem areas; it was suggested
effort should be devoted to increasing the number of such proposals.
This may appear to be an excellent means of making an already diffi-
cult task impossible. But encouraging a thorough search for alterna-
tives has several advantages which outweigh the difficulties it would
introduce. The advantages are (1) increased sensitivity of the R&D
effort to fleet requirements and problems, (2) improved chances of
finding the "best" solutions, (3) improved chances of discovering
solutions and techniques which may already be available, thus provid-
ing a rapid improvement of operating conditions, (4) grouping related
problems and proposals which may then be handled more efficiently
than as isolated problems, and (5) identifying other interdependencies
to improve coordination of effort.
The question is, what is to be done with the vast collection of
proposals? The proposals must first be classified in manageable
groups. At present most proposals are originated by the activities
in response to NRO, EDG, GOR, or TSOR, and the need for classi-
fication and forwarding for assignment is less pronounced because
the originator expects to conduct the proposed R&D. Classification is
carried out for planning and budgeting purposes. The nine major
programs and the six categories of the R&D program (6) have already
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been introduced. Further divisions are "aggregations" and "program
elements. " The aggregation is a major subdivision of a category and
consists of a number of program elements within the Advanced Devel-
opment or Engineering Development categories. The program element
is the smallest subdivision of the RDT&E program considered in the
OSD system, and may be a single project or a number of projects in a
related field and in the same budget category. An example of this
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classification is shown below.
32 03. 09.
-Arm of service (Navy)
•-Element (hydrofoils)
'-Aggregate (underseas warfare)
Dept of the Navy (includes USMC)
'—Category (advanced development)
-Numbered program (research and development)
Figure 3-2
Classification System
Additional classification is required for reporting purposes of
approved projects. Each DoD RDT&E project is identified with a
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class of effort as follows.
Applied Research (AR)- -application of knowledge,
material, and/or techniques directed toward
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Basic Research (BR)--research directed toward the
increase of knowledge in science, the primary
aim of the investigator being a fuller knowledge
or understanding of the subject under study-
Development, Test and Evaluation (DT)--projects
directed toward the development, test, or
evaluationof items of equipment and/ or systems
for experimentation or operational use
Management and Support (MS)- -items of general
support, necessary for the management and
operation of RDT&E installations oractivities
All expenses covered in RDT&E appropriations are classified in one
of the eight principal budget activities presented in Chapter 1.
The expanded set of alternatives external to the R&D community
requires classification to assign proposals to the appropriate activities.
Concurrently with this classification, a very rough evaluation may be
made of the potential value and feasibility of the proposals. It will be
assumed here that a single clearinghouse will perform the classifica-
tion and rough evaluation, but the same functions could be performed
at a group of clearinghouses, the only difference being that part of the
classification would have been completed by the location of the clearing-
houses and the manner in which the proposals were solicited.
The clearinghouse must be staffed by naval officers to evaluate the
potential military value, and by scientists and engineers from a variety
of disciplines to evaluate the type of research or development required
and its feasibility. The classification and consolidation of the proposals
is the primary function; the evaluation is necessary to support the
classification and eliminate those proposals which are obviously unsafe,
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would cause larger problems, or would cost more to carry out than
they could possibly contribute.
Once the proposals and problems have been determined to warrant
investigation, they are evaluated as to the general category of work
required: basic and applied research, exploratory development, or
engineering and operational systems development. This classification
is based hn the difference between the current state of the art and the
technological requirements of the proposal. It determines whether the
proposals come under the cognizance of CNR, CND, or DCNO(D).
The next classification is performed on a subject basis for research
proposals, and on a function or problem basis for development proposals
This determines which division of ONR, NMSE, or other office will have
direct responsibility for further evaluation of the proposal. The classi-
fication process is summarized in Figure 3-3.
The advantage of increased attention to the search for alternatives
and the subsequent classification is that it can increase cooperation and
mutual support between activities. Parallel development efforts can be
identified and the means to control them established. Areas of mutual
interest may be pinpointed quickly and easily; for example, unexpected
failures in fire control radars and radio receivers may be traced to
fluctuations in the ship's electrical supply or to atmospheric distur-
bances. A single project could replace two or three projects in solving




























knowledge of some physical process, and support could be obtained
from ONR by the classification system. The solutions to some of the
fleet-originated proposals or problems may already be available,
permitting off-the-shelf improvements to be accomplished simply by
creating an awareness of the problem. Proposals which cut across the
classification lines can be readily identified and the necessary com-
munications and cooperation can be established at the outset.
The classification system assists activities in maintaining a list of
potential projects which may be undertaken as the current projects are
completed, and by permitting early identification of new requirements
it may reduce the number of products which become obsolete before
they become operational. Proposals which are classified as technologi-
cally infeasible become part of an "inactive" list, where they can be
re-evaluated as advances in technology and science occur. The
appearance of numerous interdependencies may cause projects to be
undertaken that separately have little merit and would remain inactive.
The maintenance of lists of active and inactive projects has been
recommended by Brandenburg and Stedry, and they prescribe in detail
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the procedures for reviewing the lists. Their presentation was
based on a "Research" and "Development" dichotomy, but is applicable
to the multiple classification used by the Navy as well.
Implicit in this classification system is the belief that the sequen-




be used should be made by the R&D community at the level at which
the work must be carried out. The classification system is designed
to direct the proposals of those levels, and to provide the working
levels with additional guidance on the value of the military applications.
By quickly uniting the problems and the personnel trained to solve them,
and by early identification of interdependencies
,
the classification
system provides the first step to speeding technological progress,
which is a major objective discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4. Evaluation of Alternatives.
More rapid technological advance is possible if there could
be a more rapid bringing together of needs, idea sources,
and allocable resources in the right kind of environment. *°
The alternatives arriving at each activity cannot be immediately
converted to full scale R&D projects. It is necessary to review the
alternatives and acquire additional information about them to decide
which ones should be studied in more detail; this process is repeated
several times. This chapter discusses the sequential evaluation
process as it is currently being carried out and presents some possible
modifications.
A highly significant characteristic of the R&D process is its
dynamic nature. The proposals and problems are not reviewed,
evaluated, and rejected or advanced to the next stage en masse, but
instead flow through the system with a large measure of independence.
New proposals are taken under study as approved projects are com-
pleted or dropped. The progress through the system of individual
proposals is presented in Figure 1-11.
For engineering and operational systems development projects,
the initial investigation is performed in writing the PTA, or similar
proposal for smaller projects. If major problems of development are
56
B-60, pp 48. Citing "Management Factors Affecting Research
and Exploratory Development, " Arthur D. Little Inc.
, pp II-7.
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identifiable in proposals of marginal significance to the Navy's mission,
the PTA may be delayed until a supporting research or exploratory
development project is completed. Completed PTA's are reviewed by
CNO for their potential contribution. If requirements have changed or
more desirable means of solving the same problem are available, the
proposal will be dropped. The more valuable proposals are examined
for the degree of risk involved. If this risk is high, the proposal may
be designated as an Advanced Development Project. If the risk is
acceptable an SOR is issued and further study is undertaken to produce
the Technical Development Plan. At this point the activity formulates
plans for carrying the project through to production and operation.
The expense of obtaining enough information to develop these plans
requires both a high potential military value and a high probability of
successful development. The TDP is reviewed by CNO and DDR&E
and if approved becomes a full scale project. The procedure is long
and tortuous., and only the best proposals survive.
The successive requirements for review contribute to the long R&D
lead times and appear to be a departure from the policy of decentralized
execution. The question arises as to how much of the review process
is designed to keep top management informed and how much is necessary
for efficient control. The answer, quoting Secretary of Defense
McNamara: "Poor planning, unrealistic schedules, unnecessary
design changes and enormous cost increases. . .have continuously
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disrupted the efficient operation of our research and development
57program," i. e.
,
under present conditions the review is designed
primarily for control. The need for control, and hence the time
required for processing the proposals, may be decreased by introduc-
ing a more orderly and integrated evaluation process, by improving
the project reporting process, and by increasing the emphasis on
promulgating objectives and requirements to the R&D community.
This is easier said than done, but not impossible. Some suggested
approaches are presented in the following pages.
The activity has been provided with a set of problems and propo-
sals, an indication of their military potential, and information
concerning interdependencies within the set of proposals and with
proposals being investigated at other activities. It also has a list of
its own objectives and a knowledge of its facilities, personnel, and
current projects. It must combine this information to maximize its
contribution over time to the R&D effort, a difficulty quantity to
measure after the fact and more difficult to predict. A tentative
measure of effectiveness is the expected military potential of com-
pleted projects, which is to be maximized subject to cost and resource
availability constraints. This topic will be considered in more detail in
Chapter 5.
57
B-28, pp 1. From a hearing before a subcommittee of the
Senate Appropriations Committee on 24 April 1963.
96
The following information is desirable in solving the allocation
problem: the exact characteristics of the anticipated output and its
associated military worth; the probability of achieving that output;
the cost of achieving it and then producing, operating, or implementing
it; the required amount of time, manhours, and other resources; and
trade offs involving time, cost, performance, and reliability. It is not
possible to obtain this exact" information in advance. In fact it is often
difficult to obtain much of it even after a product is in use. The mana-
gers must settle for a series of estimates, each one a little more
detailed and, hopefully, more accurate.
It will be useful for discussion purposes to divide the information
gathering and evaluation process into three phases. The first is appli-
cable to all categories of the R&D program, except Operational Systems
Development which will be covered separately, and corresponds to the
PTA study. The second phase is the more detailed study required for
preparation of the TDP, and it is applicable only in a general sense to
the Research and Exploratory Development programs. The third phase
includes the selection of projects from completed TDP's and the hand-
ling of subsequent PCR's; it is the "official" R&D program as included
in the FYDP. At this phase, a "clearinghouse" is available in the form
of the Navy Department Program Information Center (NDPIC). This
Navy office is responsible for processing and correlating requests for
new programs and changes to approved programs, maintaining and
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updating the documents associated with the FYDP, and monitoring the
CO
program for balance and consistency with approved Navy PO.
Phase I- -Initial Investigation
.
The alternatives received from the clearinghouse must be reviewed
quickly to provide additional correlation of problems and proposals and
to select those that can be most efficiently studied as a single project.
These related problems and proposals will be referred to as phase I
projects. The managers should then assign two or three researchers
to conduct the initial investigation of each phase I project. The first
step is a clear, concise statement of the problem, and assistance from
a Navy representative is desirable for this. The given proposals and
the researcher's knowledge of the state-of-the-art must be applied to
the problem to estimate the difficulty of obtaining solutions to the
problems. This may be a success-or-failure consideration, but the
possibility of attaining down-graded objectives or "interim" solutions
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should also be investigated.
The feasibility of the phase I project is not by itself sufficient to
warrant proceeding with development. Once the problem and desired
solution are defined and the potential value assigned, estimates must
be made of the probability of achieving the solution by each of the





estimates must be made of the R&D cost, system cost, personnel
requirements, time needed to achieve the solution (not the "crash"
schedule unless the problem is desperate; the time-saving benefits
of a crash program are highly questionable) and product reliability.
Trade-off analyses are also required for the PTA; a value -engineering
approach is useful even in the initial design and planning stages. By
providing an estimate of the requirements and schedule for attaining
both the desired capability and degraded objectives, the phase I study
group puts the trade-off information in the most useful form for the
activity manager.
Some of the projects may require a major advance in the state-of-
the-art, and the advance may require work not usually done by the
activity. Such projects may be transferred (completely or in part) to
the Research or Exploratory Development categories, or recommended
for contractor performance. A phase I project may be in good shape
except for a particular portion, and that portion may warrant Explora-
tory Development support or closer attention as an Advanced Develop-
ment project. Any transfer of responsibility should be accompanied
by the report of the phase I project findings, including the reason for
trasnfer. The process of combining related problems and proposals
may eliminate the basis for some entirely.
It is emphasized that phase I is envisioned as a thoughtful, syste-
matic, and rapid first cut at project evaluation. The actual number of
man-hours required will vary with the complexity and magnitude of the
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problem addressed, but to indicate the level of effort proposed,
three-quarters of the projects should require less than six research
man-hours. This number is considerably less than the current level
of effort applied to the PTA (activities are now required to submit
PTA's within 90 days of the issue of the GOR or TSOR ), but it is
assumed that the report will be utilized at the activity level for pre-
liminary planning rather than being forwarded to CNO. The large
number of alternatives which must be considered necessitates this
rapid evaluation.
In order to implement this rapid initial evaluation procedure, there
are three essential requirements: (1) a personnel assignment policy
which permits a small percentage of the activity's research personnel
to concentrate on a review of recent developments in their field and to
work on the initial evaluation, (2) a set of estimating relationships for
the required information, and (3) the accurate and detailed information
of Navy R&D objectives emphasized in previous chapters. The evaluat-
ing personnel would not be assigned on a permanent basis; it may be
convenient to assign scientists and engineers to evaluating duties as
they complete current projects. This would provide them with the
opportunity to catch up on the literature, investigate new problems,
request projects for their next assignment, and gain a better apprecia-
tion of the manager's problems as they assist him in the planning
process.
° C-14, pp 4.
100
The estimating relationships will require pre-implementation and
continuing analysis. Many estimating relationships are now available
within the activities. CNA and other organizations performing cost
analysis have developed additional data and estimating techniques.
The Navy Program Factors Manual contains some cost information
that may be used directly. Rapid costing techniques which would be
useful for this phase are presented by A. J. Meltsner in reference
B-39. Other estimates may be derived from available data; some
will require educated guesses and provision for the collection of new
data in the future. The time allotted may seem to deny the existence
of the uncertainty. On the contrary, it gives full recognition to the
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fact that initial estimates have generally been inaccurate. Reliance
on detail at this stage cannot overcome the inaccuracy. The additional
time and effort required is difficult to justify. The belief that smaller
errors in a large number of components will provide mutual cancella-
tion has not been substantiated in practice.
The procedures of phase I are consistent with the concept of
decentralized execution supported by promulgation of specific objectives
and requirements, with the benefits of bringing research personnel into
the planning function, with the requirements of researchers for time to
keep up-to-date in their field, and with accelerating the advance of
technology as indicated in the quotation beginning the chapter. The




review of the PTA, but the phase I reports should be adequate to keep
top management informed. The measure of uncertainty makes the
advantages of top-level review at this stage questionable. The activity-
manager and his "evaluating teams" are in a better position to weigh
the uncertainty. Forwarding the phase I reports of only those projects
scheduled by the activity manager may be sufficient; it may be a
closer approximation to what is actually being done than is apparent
from the formal procedures described in Chapter 1. Possible format
and contents of the phase I report are indicated in Figure 4-1.
Implementation of these procedures would be difficult but justifi-
able. In addition to the advantages listed above, it would contribute to
building the much needed data base, especially for early estimating
relationships. "Keeping score" of the accuracy of the estimates would
improve the estimates. The difficulty of having the people with the
right skills available to do the evaluating should be controlled by the
classification process and the personnel assignment policy. (The
inter -subject communications could easily improve to the point where
many problems could be resolved during a coffee-break or stock-
market review. ) The procedures will facilitate early recognition of
major problems, permitting an early start on critical areas.
Phase II- -Detailed Evaluation.
The second phase requires that the steps of solving the problem be













































































































































































requirements must be estimated as accurately as possible. The
problem of whether to conduct the research in-house or to contract
for it must be considered. The specific information required in the
TDP is listed on page 47, Chapter 1.
Phase II would normally require a slightly larger number of
researchers, perhaps three to five, depending on the size of the
project. The study is sufficiently detailed to identify the major
problems which may be added tothe list of alternatives at other acti-
vities or selected for pursuit as separate projects within the evaluating
activity. It has been recommended that definite criteria be established
for transfer of work between various categories of R&D, but the
difficulty of making standardized measurement of research and develop-
ment progress or problems points to the telephone as a more reasonable
means for deciding whether or not to make the transfer.
As the alternate approaches to solution are worked out and dis-
played on a PERT diagram (one of the TDP requirements), more
detailed cost estimates are possible. Engineering estimates and
research experience can be brought to bear in addition to statistical
techniques. Institutions such as RAND rely heavily on the latter, but
they do so largely because they cannot keep on their staff the great
64
. ,
variety of engineering skills that would be necessary. But if the




B-34, pp XIII- 1.
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they can benefit from the engineering estimates as well. To the extent
that it may be a deviation from current practices, the concept of the
activities performing their own estimates should be emphasized. The
information to be obtained is essential to conducting projects. Even
if it is never written down, it enters into project selection considera-
tion. The estimating techniques are not such abstract or specialized
procedures that economists or reliability engineers or value-engineering
specialists are required, although such assistance should be available
for unusual cases. In using the PERT diagram or similar representa-
tion of project effort, the timing of estimated expenditures can easily
be obtained. While the total expenditures are required, the cost-by-
time information should not be omitted from the presentation since the
manager will have a preference for both the time and amount of expendi-
tures.
Mentioning cost and time together brings up the subject of discount-
ing or time preference for expenditures. There are a number of widely
used discounting techniques, and arguments have been made against the
use of any of them. It is not the purpose of this thesis to resolve the
discounting question. The use of discounting to account for risk, how-
ever, is specifically opposed. The risk can be better controlled by
evaluating the project's probabilities of success, and by administrative
procedures such as the use of Advanced Development projects rather
than Engineering or Operational System Development projects.
Broussalian argues the time preference discounting can be applied
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only to marketable streams. It is not reasonable to place military
capabilities in that category. Furthermore, the different capabilities
sought cannot generally be assumed to behave according to the same
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time preferences. It is more reasonable to incorporate time prefer-
ences in the project definitions by altering the potential military value
of the objective obtained at different times. This approach can better
reflect urgency as determined by battlefield requirements Or SECDEF
decree. It is probable that when these considerations apply, they will
often be overriding; i. e. , if a new anti-SAM weapon system is required
for immediate use in Vietnam, that research will probably be started
without detailed comparison with all other current and proposed pro-
jects. Lesser degrees of urgency may be handled by modifying the
value of objective as suggested.
It is proposed in the next chapter that the expected budgets=for
successive years be used to constrain R&D expenditures. The discount-
ing techniques imply alternative use of funds, such as putting the money
in the bank. Such lending and borrowing concepts are poorly defined
within military budgeting concepts. The discounting techniques intro-
duce a preference for future expenditures over current ones; this
tends to further reduce cost estimates which have traditionally been
too low. While the underestimation cannot be blamed on discounting,





reasoning applies to discounting future benefits, since "a pervasive
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tendency to undervalue future outputs relative to current ones"
already exists. And finally, the errors in estimates are apt to obscure
the refinement supplied by discounting. For these reasons, discounting
will be omitted. Again, it is not the purpose of this discussion to
permanently rule out discounting. It may be reintroduced in the model
if desired.
The TDP includes estimates of production, operating, and main-
tenance costs. This information is primarily for top-management
review. The estimates of the timing of these costs are apt to be less
accurate than the estimates of the R&D costs and timing. Estimates
of total expenditures for these categories, estimates of the time of
starting production and operation, and a brief outline of the transition
from research and development to production, training, and operation
should be included. However, the effort required for great detail in
these areas at this phase is again difficult to justify. Reasonable esti-
mates are important in deciding which projects to select and which
completed projects to produce, but the high project mortality rate can
lead to much wasted effort. As the projects progress, more reliable
estimates become available and more accurate planning is practicable.
When to expend effort to obtain information is another managerial
consideration.
A-8, pp 248 and Chapter 2.
68
A-14, pp XV, 17.
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Cost distributions are more helpful than point estimates in
recognizing the degree of uncertainty in predicting costs, although
they make computations more difficult. The distributions give mana-
gers a better picture of the possible outcomes of their plans, and
make them painfully aware of the flexibility that their job requires.
69Dienemann and Sobel have suggested interesting techniques for
combining the distributions to predict total costs. Both techniques
obtain beta distributions based on estimates supplied by the activity
for each of the uncertain cost factors. Dienemann' s model combines
the cost distributions by Monte Carlo techniques to obtain the total
cost distribution. Soebel's model employes the first four moments of
the beta distribution to obtain the total xost distribution. Both proce-
dures have been computerized; Dienemann 1 s is easily applied only if
the costs of inputs are independent. Except in large projects, the
expected value approach is sufficiently easier to make it preferable,
and the intuitive notion of the uncertainty involved is adequate.
As the phase II study progresses, it is important to acquire a
source of military information and a review of related studies which
have been completed or are in progress. Ascalternate development
paths and trade offs between performance and cost of development
appear, information on the operating environment and requirements
becomes critical. The fleet input to the set of R&D alternatives may-
provide some sources, and P-coded officers on sea duty could serve
69
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as fleet R&D representatives as a "collateral duty. " Any such use of
the training supplied by the Navy warrants consideration, and in my
personal opinion, the extra challenge would be appreciated and not
resented by the P-coded officers. The review of related studies may
reveal immediate solutions, sources of additional information, and
some major problems, and it should eliminate unnecessary duplication.
All estimates in the TDP should be documented to show which
costs and problems were considered and which techniques were used
to obtain the estimates. Changes in product concept or specifications
must be clearly identified in time, the new estimates explained, and
the old ones retained. Historically these changes have been a major
reason for poor estimates and for the difficulty of obtaining valid
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information from old data. This information is essential to the
activities in improving future estimates and techniques, and it may
also permit subsequent review to detect errors of omission. Specific
identification must be made of areas of uncertainty. If the project is
approved, the uncertainties may be eliminated at various stages of
development. If the uncertainties are clearly pointed out in the TDP,
the process of updating estimates and plans is much easier than if the
uncertainties are sprinkled liberally throughout the document or enter
only as generalized "safety factors." L. S. Hill has addressed this





estimating uncertainty: state-of-the-art, capability and availability
of personnel, test results, availability of hardware, system reliability,
interfaces with other projects, and anticipated impasses or break-
throughs.
In phases I and II, standardized estimating techniques and docu-
mentation of the procedures, sources, and considerations have been
emphasized. If followed up by a cold, clear evaluation, they may-
help eliminate Perry's "mythography"--a term which "identifies a
situation in which an unreal representation of events and their causa-
tion becomes widely acceptable and is eventually transcribed into a
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procedural ritual. " In a rather caustic but healthy examination of
military R&D, he points out several examples of such occurrences.
One example of particular interest to R&D managers is that of
program acceleration, which Perry indicates may have been made an
unrealistic option by today's "extremely tight but inherently realistic
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scheduling. " He compared ten similar Air Force programs, five of
which were conducted at the "normal"rate and five as "crash" programs,
and found little difference in the average times between the groups and
less variance within the group of accelerated projects. While the
evidence is not overwhelming, it does warrant second thoughts about
the employment of crash programs and the disturbance they cause in









Early estimates of reliability are also considered by the phase II
study group, and steps are spelled out for testing to be performed and
requirements which must be met. The reliability procedures for
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weapons systems are highly refined and very demanding. They are
so extensive that it appears that there may not always be enough time
and people available to perform all the required tests. This would
result in final tests being administered on a sample of the prescribed
tests. Somewhat less attention is devoted to the cost and time trade
offs associated with acquiring the reliability estimates and confidence
intervals. The lack of flexibility is justifiable in cases where the
reliability determines the safety of personnel, but where reliability
is not so vital it may be advantageous to permit and encourage a
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value-analysis approach to reliability requirements. Use of the
exponential distribution and the "no wear-out" assumption in many
tests adds to the conservative nature of the reliability program.
While increased flexibility is desirable, the overall reliability pro-
gram and its execution provide an excellent model for developing
other estimating techniques. Cost, time, and probability of success
are more difficult to estimate, and there are no tests of these quanti-
ties similar to reliability tests, but an attempt to include these factors
with standardized procedures must be made.
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See references B-26 and B-52
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Phase III- -Evaluation of Projects in Process
.
Phase III commences when the project is approved for inclusion in
the FYDP and the actual research and development is started. The
evaluation of trade offs, problems, and progress must continue until
the project is completed or dropped. The same considerations pre-
sented in the first two phases are applicable, recognizing that decisions
are being reached at various stages. Phase III will be discussed in
Chapters 6 and 7.
In-house or Contracting Decisions
.
The proposal evaluation process is designed to provide managers
with the information required to make decisions onthe selection,
scheduling, and control of projects, and to combine with the reporting
process to permit a thorough examination of completed and cancelled
projects. One of the decisions that must be made is whether the work
is to be conducted in-house or under contract with industry or non-
profit R&D institutions, and if the work is to be contracted, how is the
contractor t o be selected? This is itself a complex problem and much
has been written about it. Only the type and availability of information
recommended as a basis for this decision are considered here.
The first step is to determine whether the Navy has the capability
to carry out the project. Indications of the answer to this should
develop early in phase II as the procedures for development are outlined,
but the study group must have a working knowledge of the Navy's
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facilities and the research personnel assigned to perceive the indica-
tions. It may be better to leave the evaluation to the activity manager
on the basis of the study group's project description. On the other
hand, requiring the study group to be familiar with the capabilities of
other Navy R&D activities will encourage communications and increase
cooperation among the activities. This appears to be one of the least
expensive ways of combating the difficulties presented by extensive
decentralization.
If the proposed project is within the Navy's capabilities, the Navy
will usually conduct the R&D. The Army, which has a more centralized
R&D organization than the Navy, points out the following advantages of
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the "in-house" capability?
(1) the availability of technically proficient personnel helps
to keep the contractors honest
(2) the service laboratories are closely tied to the associated
military capabilities or branches
(3) knowledge of military requirements is better
(4) the in-house capability permits better control over project
and program continuity
(5) distinct lines of authority and control are provided
(6) recognized and controlled competition and duplication
are maintained
(7) funds are available for study of subjects of doubtful
interest to industry and university research
Even when the Navy capability exists, one of the manager's scheduling
options is to contract some work to smooth the program workload and




If it lias been determined that the Navy does not have a particular
capability, the next question is, should the capability be acquired?
Generally it will not be feasible, but it should be given consideration
when a new field is developing and/or when a new and continuing mili-
tary requirement becomes apparent. The expected costs of renting
the services or developing the capability must be estimated, and the
results discussed with CNR, who is responsible for advising ASN
(R&D) on matters regarding modification of the Navy's R&D facilities.
When it is decided to have the work done under contract, then the
contractor must be selected. For the larger projects the decision is
reached through competitive bidding. But a substantial number of
R&D contracts are negotiated non- competitively with a single firm.
Many of these contracts result from industry's interest in Navy pro-
jects and their willingness to undertake some of the preliminary
research at their own expense in hopes of getting the inside track on
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later projects. Again, it is to the Navy's advantage to encourage
this activity, and to do so openly to stimulate competition.
Numerous criteria have been suggested for use in contractor or
source selection; most of them are subjective, or at best, difficult
to measure. Others have attempted direct quantification by the num-
ber of published papers, patents, and PhD's, but these don't directly
measure the potential military contribution. Evaluation of past
performance based on whether delivered items exceeded, equalled, or
77
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fell short of specifications is a more pertinent measure, and a similar
evaluation of costs and time schedules should be made. This analysis
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is compounded by the project changes that occur so frequently.
The subjective estimates of performance can be improved by more
careful recording of all changes to project estimates as suggested
previously.
The Concept Formulation/Contract Definition procedures (see
Chapter 1, pp 47-8) were established for major projects as a result of
the following problems:
(1) failure to achieve the desired effectiveness
(2) large cost overruns
(3) project cancellation after much time and heavy expenditures
(4) descriptive changes, caused by overdependence on technolo-
gical breakthroughs
When the CF/CD procedures were implemented, several difficulties
were encountered. These difficulties were studied for DoD and
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summarized in Lessons Learned from Contract Definition and are
discussed in the next three paragraphs.
Lack of government guidance in the CD Work Statement reflected
directly in the contractor's efforts. The need for describing require-
ments in the early stages of the project is even more important in
dealing with contractors than it is in the in-house work, because the
contractors will have less knowledge of the Navy's objectives and






which are to be considered and the ranges over which the trade offs
are acceptable. The report recommended that the contractors be
allowed freedom in making the trade-off decision, but this is heavily-
dependent on the government's ability to make the difficult specifica-
tion of limits in advance. The military services will not want, and
cannot afford, to relinquish these decisions. If the decisions were
left to the contractors, the services would probably reduce the trade-
off ranges to a "<$" -neighborhood" about the desired quantity, and the
system would be right back where it was before trade-off analyses
were introduced.
Two particularly delicate areas of Contract Definition are subcon-
tracting procedures and the government requirement for unlimited data
and design rights. The report indicates that both require additional
funding and study. In selecting the contractor, management must
consider whether the bidder will be making use of his technological
strength or is attempting to establish himself in a new field. The
quality of the planning in the Contract Definition phase is weighed
heavily by the government in source selection, and as a result,
contractor planning and R&D costs have increased. It may be reason-
able to consider giving R&D contractors "secondary data rights"
which would limit transfer of R&D results to source contractor's
competitors, or attach an additional cost to such transfers. Contract
incentives could be related to these secondary rights.
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The major difficulty in CD was identified as the excessive delays
in initiating actual development which resulted. The causes for the
80delay were listed as:
(1) insufficient evidence that prerequisites would be met
(2) lack of specified minimum acceptable requirements
(3) extra time required for evaluation of contractor/
subcontractor proposals
(4) slowness of decisioniin OSD, and administrative delays
in the services.
Throughout this chapter the problem of obtaining detailed information
before work commences has been emphasized. The delays from
contract definition are excellent examples. The realistic use of trade
offs as recommended will help solve the dilemma, but the best answer
lies in developing a means of writing good faith and cooperation into a
legal contract. These are the only ingredients that will bring about
significant reduction of the delays. The uncertainties and risks of
R&D demand that the sequential decision-making process be incorpor-
ated in the contract. Neither government nor contractors will want to
absorb all the risk. The solution will probably involve sharing the
risk and the efforts to reduce risk by improving estimating procedures.
81A Summary of Lessons Learned from Air Force Management Surveys
gives added support to these conclusions, and it is another publication
of interest to Navy R&D managers. It is more detailed than the CD
report, and is not restricted to CD; it is a concise presentation of





Parallel development in R&D is another subject that has been
presented in this chapter, although it has not been identified as such.
Parallel development is a process of controlled duplication in which
two or more means of obtaining a given objective are pursued.
Exploration of multiple alternatives has been a primary consideration
in both Chapters 3 and 4, and the process should continue at least
until success along one path is assured. Hitch and McKean present
82
the criteria for the amount of duplication as follows:
(1) the greater the expected payoff from the research, the
greater the duplication
(2) the greater the uncertainties involved, the greater the
duplication
(3) the cheaper it is to duplicate, the greater the duplica-
tion
(4) the greater the qualitative differences in alternatives,
and the greater the degree of independence of factors
determining success, the greater the duplication
For these and any other criteria that may be developed, it is essential
that the amount of duplication be known and controlled. The clearing-
house concept, the classification process , and the sequential evaluation
process are all specifically designed to provide the required informa-
tion and control, and to exploit the advantages of parallel development.
R. R. Nelson presents an interesting case for parallel develop-
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He concludes that when estimates are unreliable, the best decision is
likely to involve obtaining more information- -through development-
-
about alternative proposals.
Evaluation Differences by R&D Category .
The sequential evaluation and decision-making concepts discussed
in this chapter are applicable to all categories of R&D. Hence, all
categories were treated together. This does not imply that no distinc-
tions between categories are acknowledged. The greatest differences
lie in the extent to which estimates are possible and in the complexity
of the objectives. (Complexity here refers to the number of components
and interfaces involved in the desired end result, not the difficulty or
sophistication of techniques involved. )
In Research, the manager's only objective is to advance the
frontiers of knowledge in some area of possible interest to the Navy;
these areas are not restrictive. More than in any other category,
efforts in research require a certain amount of faith in the scieintific
process. It is interesting to note the frequency with which this high
evaluation of the capabilities and advantages of basic research is
advocated in the literature. The Navy apparently has more of this
faith than the other services. (See Appendix A. ) In 1959, the Naval
Research Advisory Committee recommended to the Secretary of the
Navy that a fixed (and increased) percentage of the total R&D budget
119
84be allocated to basic research. This is a rather arbitrary way of
running an R&D program, but there are no adequate measurements
of the return on R&D to develop more refined techniques. Apparently
until better methods than those given in the introduction of Chapter 9
are developed, we shall have to keep the faith. Incidentally, the
Navy's Research expenditures in 1964, 5, and 6 were approximately
9. 7%, 9. 3% and 9. 8%, respectively, of its total Program VI expendi-
tures.
A review of the research/development percentages of total R&D
expenditures and company net annual sales failed to provide guidelines
as to what the percentages should be. The definitions of the two
categories varied from firm to firm, and the data were not available
at all for some companies. The amounts and percentages varied
widely with the type and "age" of the company and with its speciality
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area. The report by the Naval Research Advisory Committee
discussed above suggested as a general rule that the emphasis on
basic research should increase with the technological strength of the
enemy and decrease as the immediate probability of conflict increases
They further recommended that the detailed allocation of effort be





placing their bets on the basis of the competence of the investigator
and the relevance of the project.
Exploratory Development is directed toward somewhat more
specific objectives, but not generally to the point of detailed a priori
specifications of end-item characteristics. In seeking potential appli-
cations of advances obtained from the Research category, or external
breakthroughs, this category demonstrates the direction of information
flow from pure science to operational military products. The com-
bined system flows are presented in Figure 4-2. Frequently a great
deal of testing and experimentation is necessary before specific appli-
cations can be formulated. This requires that the phase II type of
evaluation be accompanied or preceded by testing and experimentation.
Estimates of military potential become more meaningful in allocation
of effort.
Advanced Development projects involve an intensified continuation
of Exploratory Development or an additional stage of evaluation for
Engineering Development or Operational Systems Development projects
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involving high risks. Glennan describes projects in this category
as the building blocks from which operational products are developed,
and recommends greater utilization of this category. As key areas
in funding, the Advanced Development projects give full recognition to
86
B-42, pp 5, 53.
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the sequential nature of R&D planning. But if they must meet the same
requirements for approval as Engineering or Operational Systems
Development, the procedure will be self-defeating and will lead to
relative short-range projects rather than the more sophisticated,
technologically advanced development for which they were designed.
Glennan suggests that the Advanced Development projects should be
applied to components, drawing the components together only when
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the threat or need becomes more clear. The potential advantage
is more rapid administrative processing of the proposals, but the
suggestion must be implemented with caution. A common criticism
of R&D efforts is that excessive delays occur in integrating system
components to obtain compatibility. If the necessary coordination
can be supplied informally, then the suggestion can be made to work;
without the coordination, the delay will merely be postponed and
magnified by incompatibility.
The phase I and II presentations are directly applicable to projects
in the Engineering Development category.
Operational Systems Development projects are similar to the
Engineering Development category, but differ in that they are more
complex and seldom have the same inauspicious beginning. Usually
resulting from a threat modification, a major technological advance,




these projects are initiated by a detailed systems analysis. The
Naval Warfare Analysis Group of CNA performs many of these
studies; others are performed by independent systems -analysis
groups under Navy contract. The studies do not simply start with a
problem and set of alternatives, but instead go back to the prelimin-
ary planning phase described in Chapter 3.
A scenario is developed for the problem under consideration,
and measures of cost and effectiveness are considered for evaluating
alternative means of meeting the specified commitment. The alter-
natives are postulated from existing forces and capabilities and from
recent or anticipated technological advances. These inputs are com-
bined in a mathematical (optimization) program, frequently computer-
ized, and the alternatives are evaluated by the program. The study
and results are recorded in a report for management evaluation; the
report usually fills several volumes and often requires a summary
report. Management's decisions are then implemented as Operational
Systems Development projects. Phases I and II have been completed,
and phase III commences with a reduced set of alternatives— often
only one. Parallel development generally receives little or no con-
sideration. Dissenting opinions in the analysis are often deleted
from the report in interest of preserving the activity's image.
The procedure is impressive and very useful. But it is so
impressive that it may suppress questioning and doubts, and therein
lies the danger. So, let the procedure be examined for elements of
mythography.
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To consider the obvious first, the model can be no more realistic
than the assumptions that are built into it. The assumptions must be
clearly stated, collected for easy review, and evaluated for their
effect on the results. Is the scenario reasonable? If not, the alter-
natives can be evaluated under alternative conditions, and this is
often done. Are significant alternatives omitted? If so, additional
computations can be made quite easily. Are trade offs considered?
They usually are, and if the report is not filed away in a dark closet,
the trade offs can be very helpful in continuing project analysis
throughout the development process. The comparison of alternatives
is likewise useful, and can be a major asset in considering parallel
development- -if the alternatives have not been ruled out on the basis
of the initial evaluation. Once again, the importance of recognizing
the uncertainties in the development of postulated alternatives is
obvious
.
The question of what happens to completed studies is recurrent
in the preceding paragraph. The final study report can be invaluable
to the activity performing the project R&D if it is available, utilized,
and clearly written. The analysis should not be considered as a one-
shot, self-destroying process. The clarity of the report is even more
critical to the reviewing authorities. In studying a number of final
reports, that element was found to be absent in some; its absence
was dramatized in cases where the resulting summary report failed
to give a faithful reproduction of the actual conclusions of the study.
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The summary report is usually written when the full study report
is too lengthy to permit efficient review by management. This implies
the decisions are to be made on the basis of the summary report. This
in turn implies that when the summary report distorts or misreprei-
sents the conclusions, there will be a direct waste of several man-
years of effort in systems analysis, a greater waste in subsequent
R&D and procurement, and- -if the errors are not discovered--a
major decrease in the potential efficiency of the operational system.
Discussion of this specialized version of phases I and II leads to
the conclusion that the systems analysis should be:
(1) carefully and thoroughly developed
(2) clearly presented (and accurately summarized)
(3) critically evaluated by management, and
(4) consulted in subsequent project phases to cope with
uncertainty
Chapter 4 has emphasized the dynamic nature of R&D, the
manner in which information available increases with stage of evalua-
tion, and the need for a sequential decision process. And it has
casually slipped over the difficult problem of how the selections are
to be made, but that topic can no longer be postponed.
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Chapter 5. Sequential Selection of Projects
Frequently the problem of achieving efficiency in the
entire collection of R&D projects has been ignored.
It is assumed that a collection of projects each of
which is efficiently run will lead to efficient achieve-
ment of the total R&D objectives. "
The opinion expressed in the opening quotation could be derived
from a casual observation of most R&D operations. The varied
assortment of projects and the random appearance of the means of
selecting them stem not from a lack of concern for the efficiency of
the overall program, but rather from a lack of quantitative methodo-
90
logy for research planning. The primary causes of this condition
are the multiple sources of uncertainty which inhibit the direct appli-
cation of techniques used in other areas, and the fact that the R&D
process is designed to upset the equilibrium conditions upon which
most economic models are based. This chapter discusses the prob-
lems of project selection and some of the proposed solutions.
Specific selection criteria and the availability of information
from the evaluation process open the discussion and are followed by
broader considerations of program balance. Some possible measures
of effectiveness and constraints are presented and a selection model




is developed. A representative group of optimization techniques is
reviewed. Chapters 7 and 8 present possible methods of obtaining
more refined techniques.
Much of the Navy's R&D effort is directed at developing new
products. Other important considerations are modifications to exist-
ing equipment or revisions of operating techniques to reduce cost or
increase effectiveness or safety. The operating techniques are
studied by the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) of CNA, and its
efforts are generally separated from the rest of the R&D community.
But the observations they make on forces and equipment in action
provide valuable information for the R&D process. Not only do indi-
cations of equipment problems become apparent, but the development
of new tactics or operating procedures may provide additional insight
into design characteristics and specifications for future equipment.
These observations increase the data base for the evaluation process,
and the study performed provides a potential means for measuring
the effectiveness of completed R&D projects. The different purposes
of R&D activities must be considered in the selection process and
full advantage taken of the additional information available from the
fringes of the R&D community.
Selection Criteria and Availability of Information .
The clearinghouse classification process is basically a rejection
process. Proposals are reviewed for military desirability and safety,
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and those found lacking in either are eliminated from the program.
A few proposals may be rejected on technological grounds. Some
techniques may have been proven unsatisfactory, but current feasi-
bility is used primarily to determine the R&D category to which the
proposal should be assigned. If any doubt about a project exists, it
should be forwarded.
Phase I continues this process, adds initial cost estimates, and
further correlates related topics and proposals. The initial compari-
son of alternatives eliminates obviously inferior proposals, and other
projects which are expected to cost more than they could contribute
are rejected. The expected return must exceed the expected cost,
but this is a necessary condition and not a sufficient condition for
undertaking the project. It is of limited use because the military
value is difficult to assess in dollars, but a subjective comparison
is useful for forwarding projects to phase II or rejecting them. (The
reaction to a PTA recommending "don't do it" is difficult to predict,
but "don't" should be included in the set of alternatives. ) Even in the
case where the military potential and expense of a new product are
commensurable, this criteria cannot be used with precision because
of the rough estimates used.
The classification review and phase I evaluation thus weed out a
relatively small portion of the proposals and group the others so as
to identify related problems, alternative solutions, and relationships
to projects already underway. More detailed criteria are needed to
129
decide which projects are to be studied in phase II, pursued as official
R&D projects, or dropped from the program, and to decide when these
events should occur. The criteria have been discussed in Chapter 4.
They will be reviewed briefly here, and some more general criteria
problems will be considered.
The literature abounds with lists of criteria which effect project
selection; some are easily quantified, others are highly subjective,
and almost all are interrelated. Of those useful for military R&D
selection (excluding commercial criteria such as expected sales), the
following are listed:
(1) potential military worth
(2) state-of-the art; current and required
(3) probability that various alternative solutions will be
successful
(4) cost required to perform the R&D
(5) cost required to procure, operate, maintain, and
support the end item
(6) time required for R&D
(7) time required for procurement and operation
(8) expected lifetime of product type
(9) reliability of product in mission environment
(10) facilities required for RDT&E
(11) personnel required for RDT&E
(12) project value interrelationships
(13) sequence of dependent projects
(14) cost, time, reliability, and probability-of-success
trade offs
(15) previous experience in field
The degree of availability of this information varies with R&D cate-
gory and the length of time the project has been under study.
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The potential military worth of projects and combinations of
projects is one of the most important criteria. Assigning relative
importance values to independent projects may be accomplished
without too much difficulty, but placing even a relative weight on the
incremental value resulting from a combination of projects (e.g.
,
manned bombers and ICBM's, as mentioned previously) requires
careful evaluation and top-level review. A subjective attempt to
include the interdependencies is preferable to omitting them. In
projects whose purpose is to reduce the cost of a current operation
or procedure, the benefit may be taken as the expected cost reduction.
But this raises the incommensurability problem again; the units of
military worth must be converted to dollars or the cost savings to
units of military worth.
The state-of-the-art consideration may be absorbed in cost, time,
and probability of success criteria, but a direct statement of the
dependence on technological breakthroughs facilitates updating esti-
mates as the breakthroughs are achieved. The past experience of
the activity in a given field requires an evaluation of the capability
of the activity to perform a particular type of work and may permit
recognition of areas which could be or are being handled more
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economically by another activity or contractor.
The cost and time estimates were covered in Chapter 4, with




time expected between the operational date of the product and the time
that it is phased out (by replacement equipment or changing require-
ments) is useful information, but difficult to predict. In spite of the
difficulty, the replacement problem should be specifically addressed.
The classification process should ease the burden somewhat by provid-
ing an in-flow of related problems and proposals. Direct evaluation
of this problem may help award selection of projects which will
become obsolete before they become operational, as happened to the
Snark and Navaho missiles. Both were overtaken by the IBM program
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and cancelled before any useful operational capability was achieved.
The timing of projects must be spelled out in detail, and combined
with requirements for personnel and facilities. Time interdependence
of projects must also be specified. The military value of projects is
also time dependent, and this provides the major time preference
considerations. The model as written distinguishes between the
length of projects, but not between projects of the same duration and
different completion times. The dynamic nature of the R&D program
makes personnel and facility constraints binding on the selection and
scheduling problem. Even if activity expansion is desirable, the
acquisition of new facilities will generally require very long leadtimes,
and obtaining additional qualified scientists and engineers may also
present problems. It is for these reasons that the model constraints
927 B-25, pp 15.
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developed in the last section of this chapter are expressed specifi-
cally in terms of personnel and facilities.
Two probability statements are included in the list of criteria:
the probability that a particular technological approach and combina-
tion of personnel, time, and funds will successfully achieve the
prescribed end product, and the probability that the end product will
still be operating at the completion of its designed mission (reliability),
The first is a subjective evaluation- -hopefully one that will improve
with experience in making the estimate- -and without entering into the
debate on the true nature of probabilities, it does provide useful
information. The reliability estimate can be obtained mathematically.
If testing can be performed it can usually be specified to any degree
of accuracy and statistical confidence. The two probabilities are
very much interdependent.
An example will indicate the number of alternatives which rapidly
develop from these considerations, even in obtaining a single end item.
Consider the development of a hypothetical electrical device, which
may consist of tubes or solid state components. Each approach is
restricted to only two combinations of personnel and time, and two
cost requirements to obtain two different levels of reliability. This











Alternative Approaches for a Single Objective
The example probably does not represent any real problem, and the
probabilities of success were used to count alternatives, but it is easy
to imagine a product which may be achieved by many different com-
binations of technological approaches , time, personnel, funds,
reliability and probability of success. Some of the alternatives could
be eliminated on the basis of very low probability of success, but for
every one eliminated several new ones could be generated by relaxing
the simplifying assumption on dependence of time and personnel, and
of cost and reliability. As more refined trade-off analyses are
developed, it may be possible to determine optimal and several near-
optimal alternative project definitions.
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There is a group of hard-to-measure costs that should also be
given consideration. (See list below. ) They are difficult to include
in a quantitative model with any degree of consistency. Rather than
omit them altogether, a reasonable approach would be to include (in
the TDP or equivalent) the list of these costs, state which of them
appear to be significant, and indicate whether or not they have been
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specifically included in the selection model. The list follows and
is most generally applicable to Operational Systems Development
projects.
(1) external economies and diseconomies
(2) inherited assets
(3) shared assets (indicate method of pro-rating used)
(4) fixed supply assets
(5) salvage values
(6) spillover costs
If the decision is made to approximate and include the significant
costs from this list, they should be included in the R&D cost or total
system cost, as appropriate. This must be done consistently— not
with just a fraction of the significant costs- -and the costs included
must be clearly documented.
Program Balance.
There are several aspects of achieving a balanced R&D program.
They include the distribution of effort between basic research and




defensive capability, and among functional areas. These considera-
tions are again difficult to build into a model. It would be simple
mathematically to place upper and lower bounds on each of the cate-
gories, but determining proper values for these bounds is another
matter altogether. It is quite likely that a satisfactory means of
developing the bounds will some day be formulated, but then another
question must be answered: over what time period is "balance"
required? The random occurrence of breakthroughs makes it unlikely
that the upper and lower bounds on projects can be satisfied efficiently
at any given instant.
The amount of effort or funds alloted to basic research has
received the most attention, and it has been mentioned in previous
chapters. It is very closely related to the long-range/short-range
distribution of effort. The long-range development programs are
based on today's research programs; "applied research and devel-
opment tend to proceed more rapidly, and at a lower cost, when
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adequately backed by basic research. " There is widespread opinion
that more effort should be devoted to long-range basic research
projects, but the unsophisticated procedure of stating that X% of the
RDT&E funds should be devoted to basic research is apparently the
only one available at present. The percent, X is a rather arbitrary
number, and will remain that way until some means is developed for




The concept of balancing the distribution of R&D effort among
functional areas such as anti-submarine warfare, anti-war warfare,
electronic counter-measures, etc.
, and between offensive and defen-
sive capability is an interesting one. The R&D funds could be
allocated among functional areas in the same manner as the Navy-
allocates funds among functional areas outside of R&D, but this is not
apt to be efficient or effective. Problems and breakthroughs will
probably not be evenly distributed by functional areas. Relatively
small expenditures may therefore produce high returns in some areas,
and very heavy expenditures and large numbers of personnel may be
required to obtain any returns in other areas. In economic terms,
balance will be achieved when the marginal return per dollar cost,
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per man-hour, and per unit use of facilities are equal in each area.
But even when measurement of R&D rjsfcurns is refined to the point
where this information is obtainable, the marginal returns will be
changing frequently, thus requiring rapid feedback on development
and great flexibility in programming effort.
The requirement for a rapid reallocation of effort brings up
another problem. "Research cannot be turned on and off without
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producing disruptive effects on the program and the organization. "
How often and to what extent can the reallocation of effort be made






made to take advantage of major breakthroughs, but excessive stop
and go commands waste much time and effort, and lead to discontent
among the research personnel.
Within the R&D categories, the allocation of effort is guided by
the relative importance of objectives provided by higher levels of
management. Further evaluation of this military potential of projects
is enhanced by the presence of naval personnel at most research
activities, and by the "user-producer" relationship between CNO, and
CNR and CND. The proposed increased input of fleet problems and
proposals may also be helpful. The potential military worth of a
project is a very important criteria. for selection and reviewing the
program for balance.
The extent to which this information and this approach are used
in the research category has been criticized. Stoodley's comments
are directed at ONR but they have much broader applicability. He
cites the informal nature of communications within ONR as inhibiting
the efficient utilization of the Naval Applications Group (Section VI)
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in recognizing potential applications. He states that the "lack of
documentation prevents adequate transmission of information to upper
management levels, and results in serious discontinuities in planning
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during personnel turnover cycles. " The increased emphasis on







procedures of bringing the scientists and engineers into the activity's
planning function should help to overcome this problem.
A basic issue in balancing a program is whether the military
objectives should control the R&D effort, or whether the R&D capa-
bilities and expected returns should govern the military force
structure. As usual, neither extreme is apt to provide the best
results. The general national defense policy and the technological
advances and potential must be combined to formulate an R&D pro-
gram that is both efficient and balanced. This is the reason that
technology is shown as an input in the planning process in Figure 3-1.
The initial input is not sufficient, however; as significant new tech-
nological potential is perceived, the plans must be reviewed prior
to project selection.
A Selection Model .
The measure of effectiveness tentatively suggested previously
was the expected military potential of completed R&D projects. The
potential value of the military projects has been treated as a military
evaluation of the importance of the end product goal of the R&D study.
For this measure to indicate the R&D effectiveness, it must be based
on the difference between the current capability and that resulting
from the project, as well as the "absolute" import of the end product.
The subjective evaluation probably is effected by the magnitude of the
change, but frequent criticism of the bias toward short range, rapid
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return projects indicates that relatively little importance is attached
to the magnitude of the increase in capability.
In the section on balance, the concept of efficiency was introduced
briefly. Intuitively, some projects can provide more return per
dollar expended than others. In more precise terms, the optimal
combination of projects is obtained when the marginal product per
99dollar is the same for all input factors. The measurement prob-
lems involved have already been pointed out. Attempts are being
made to determine the cost of a "unit of research" and the personnel
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and use-of-facilities costs for various types of R&D; these may-
provide useful information in determining efficiency but still require
measures of R&D output. Even when the desired measures of
effectiveness of the R&D output become available, the concept of
efficiency will still be very difficult to apply. The application requires
a priori estimates of efficiency, and the results of R&D are designed
to upset the equilibrium conditions upon which efficiency allocations
are based. This makes the predictions extremely difficult.
The following procedure/ for obtaining the total program effec-
tiveness from the individual project values is a modification of
Shaller's presentation, eliminating project funding level factors








e.. = effectiveness contributed by the i project to the j
objective
E. = 2_, e.. = effectiveness of the i project
j
1J




E = V E. = total program effectiveness
i
Let E^ = effectiveness of current capability addressed by i
o
project
Then (E. - E- ) = magnitude of improvement proposed by i
1 o
project
The process of evaluating projects in terms of their contribution to
the organization's objectives is a good approximation of the subjec-
tive evaluation for project selection, and for this reason it is a very
useful technique. But it stops short of the desired total measurement
because of its assumption of independence. The incremental value of
completing combinations of projects should also be included.
If each alternative method of achieving a specific goal is defined
as a project, the projects are then either in the program or out.
The funding level is included in the definition of the project rather
than in the variables x- which the mathematical model is designed to
evaluate.
This gives x. = <
1 if the project is to be included in the activity's
R&D program
if the project is not included
141
If the incremental value of completing both projects i and k, where
k is used to index the same n projects as i, is designated d , the
total program effectiveness is E = ) E.x. + Y Y~ d x x ;
h- 11 *r- *r ikik
1 1 k
where d.. = V •• These incremental values represent increases in
n i r
the military capability addressed by each project individually, as
contrasted with more general spillover costs or benefits in different
areas.
The problem of whether effort should be allocated according to
the true value of the project or according to the magnitude of the
improvement over existing capabilities has not been resolved.
Reasonable arguments may be formulated for either approach; it is
reasonable to include both. Let E. represent the expected potential
value of the new product, and let. E^ be the value assigned to the
tVi
current capability in the i category. The E- can be provided by
o
top management, and this will provide a consistent basis for estimat-




How to incorporate this value depends on the relative magnitudes of




then an additive term would be easiest. If the differences are rela-
tively small, a multiplicative expression would give greater weight
to the magnitude of the advance. In the latter case, the total program
effectiveness becomes
E* = Y (E.)(E. - E. )x. + Y 7 d.^x.x.V i i in i 4 V ik i k
i ° l k
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The obvious refinement would be to express the incremental
values of pairs of projects as differences over the existing combined
capabilities, but this may be too much to expect for the present. When
more experience is gained in making the approximate quantification of
the subjective evaluations, it could be included. A further extension
would assign incremental values to various combinations of three or
more projects. The extension is desirable, but not practical due to
the difficulty of making the estimates and to the inaccuracy of the
estimates in the rest of the program. Again, it may be added as
more refined estimating skills are developed.
The obvious constraints are cost, personnel availability, and the
availability of facilities. It would be relatively easy to write the
constraints on the total R&D expenditures, total personnel, and total
facilities, but to do so would overlook several important points. The
activity's research personnel do not all possess the same skills and
training, and they probably cannot be efficiently assigned to projects
without examining their skills. It may be possible to categorize the
research personnel at each activity and provide a constraint for each
category. Let
PJ? = number of available personnel in category X , Jt - 1, 2, • • • , L
1
Then
p. n = number of category personnel required for project i
Ipu x. = P/
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But the personnel assigned to the i project may not be required for
the duration of the project. It is desirable to include time periods in
the personnel constraint as follows:
Let P/7 = number of available personnel category /< during time
increment t
p.p = number of category /personnel required for project




xi- P jft • /= i. 2 . "•..* ; t = 1, 2, •-., N
i
A similar argument may be presented for the available facilities:




f. =i project's requirement for facility m in time mcre-
lmt
ment t
Then J f. xj - F , m = 1, 2, • • • , M; t = 1, 2, • • • , N
h- imt L ~ mt
l
For both cases, the possibility of acquiring more personnel or expanded
facilities, or of "renting" them (i. e. , contracting the project or portion
of it, or hiring consultants) must be considered.
The cost constraint is more complicated. The activity will have
a budget constraint, but the R&D costs are not the only ones that effect
project selection. The total system cost estimate is the Navy's major
concern, and to consider only the R&D costs would be an undesirable
suboptimization. The R&D cost constraint can be written easily:
V RC.x. ^ R- The R&D budget R should be reduced by personnel
i
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salaries and operating expenses of facilities. It can be modified to
handle successive annual (expected) budgets. The predicted procure-
ment and operational costs will not use up the full Navy budgets for
following years, but it is difficult to establish what percentage or what
amount would be acceptable.
The current decision process requires a review of the TDP to
ascertain whether or not the total system, operating and maintenance,
and procurement costs will be acceptable. This cannot be written as
a general constraint. Rather than neglect the total cost, however, it
may be included in the objective function. Following the same reason-
ing as used for project and program effectiveness, the modified
objective function is









where Ci = total cost of project i
IOC. = investment and all operational costs of project i
IOC- = replacement and all operational costs of current
° capability i
K = proportionality constant to adjust relative size
of cost and effectiveness values
Some comments on the new quantities are in order. The total
cost C. represents all costs associated with project i, from R&D to
operating and maintenance costs. IOC^ and IOC^ are used rather
o
than total costs in the difference expression to compare the introduction
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of the new system with continued use of the old. By making the cost
expression the subtrahend, the model will properly handle cost-




will then be negative
and it is preceded by a minus sign. Hence the objective function
maximizes the cost reduction. In this type of project, the |e. - E.
will go to zero if the same level of effectiveness is maintained. The
particular costs used in the objective function may be changed if other
costs are considered as giving a better measure of cost differences;
e.g.
,
C.(C. - IOC^ ) could be used. Whatever costs are:adopted,
they should be used consistently f or all projects.
The proportionality constant K is required to convert units of
military worth to dollars. It need not be a precise conversion. It
should adjust the relative magnitudes of effectiveness and cost to
suit the subjective evaluation of that comparison.
One additional consideration that should be built into the model
is the length of time required to complete a project, £ T.. The time
requirements for use of facilities and personnel may not be sufficient
for this purpose. Since in general it is desired to minimize the time
required for development, the time consideration may be included
with the cost expression. The QT . could be used directly as another
factor in the cost expression. This may exaggerate the importance
of the time factor, and for cost reduction projects, the model would
actually maximize time required to complete projects. Since the
total value of each project considered can be assumed to be positive
146
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The +1 in the expression ^fn(l + /\T.) eliminates negative values. A
plot of the expression ^fn(a+/ T.) is shown in Figure 5-2 to display
the effect of project length on the objective function. (Note that the
reciprocal of this expression is used. ) Use of the expression decreases
Figure 5-2
Model Treatment of Project Duration
/n(a+ATJ
AT i
the effect of errors in project time estimates and the relative impor-
tance of time in the overall expression. It may be desirable to
remove the steep slope at the origin by increasing the additive constant.
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This method of indicating a preference for project duration is subjec-
tive and it is not a true discounting procedure. It represents a con-
sideration that should be made, but the precise method may be
modified to fit the subjective evaluation of time preference.
Since the alternative methods of achieving a specific goal have
been defined as separate projects in the model, program constraint
#4 must be included to prevent undertaking more than one alternative
path. Let
Y = group of alternative paths to single specific objective
Z = group of alternative paths which may be considered for
parallel development for a single specific objective.
Then
Y. x - - l > y = 1,2, • • * , Y groups
ifY *
y
2_ x.^s , s = l,2,'-'S;z=l,2," ' * , Z groups, and
i£Z.
z
s = number of parallel paths which may be considered.
The introduction of parallel paths requires a modification of the
objective function. Discussion of this modification will be tempor-
arily postponed.
Constraint #5, x ^ x , for specified pairs of values for v and w,
v w
is required if project v may be undertaken only if project w is also
included in the program.
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The model as presented is deterministic, which is certainly-
undesirable. The two probability statements obtained in the evalua-
tion process may be incorporated as follows:
Define @. = probability that project i will be successfully
completed
Y. = reliability of project i
Then SC. = total system cost of project i
E. = Q.V. - expected effectiveness of i project or
expected military value of i project
C. = RC. + i [SC. - RC.l
With the probabilities of success defined, the modification of the
objective function to handle parallel R&D can now be developed. It
will be assumed that the parallel development paths are selected so
as to be mutually independent. If two projects are selected, the
breakthrough required for each must depend on different technology.
If this is not the case, parallel development may be recommended in
more instances than desirable. Since one of the characteristics of
parallel development paths is technological independence, the assump-
tion of independence is not as damaging here as it is in most cases.
These considerations should be made in defining the parallel develop-
ment project groups.
For s = 2 (parallel development permitted, but not required, on
2 paths), the expected value will be increased if 2 paths are included,
but it cannot exceed the potential value of successful completion by
either path.
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If Y = Y, = x. , x ; , then > x. =x, +x f 2,
y 1[1Zj . L- i 1 2
1
\
If x, + x = 2, then E, = E„ ='
x + x
2
where V, = V„. Also, d* = 1 \ . d., \& + n -n a )
U + x I yi 1 l 2 2 v l r 2 1 2/ =
d*
,
where d = d_ . Similar expressions may be derived for s=3,4 , *i
The model and quantities included are summarized in Figures
5-3 and 5-4.
It may be desirable to add constraints to provide balance of effort
among functional areas, as discussed in the preceding section. But
the manner in which the model is used may make it easier to evaluate
the balance of the model output. The sequential manner in which
personnel and facilities become available to perform new projects
indicates that the model may be applied to the set of "inactive" pro-
jects and constrained by the available increments of funds, facilities,
and personnel. If projects in progress are also included in the appli-
cation, it will be desirable to update the estimates of reliability,
cost, and probability of success or otherwise redefine the current
projects. This will increase the expected value of projects which are
progressing well and improve program continuity. If this is not
sufficient to attain the desired continuity, an artificial bias may be
added for current projects. This would be a rather delicate operation,
since too large a bias may result in pursuit of projects that should be
dropped.
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Successive iterations of the program may be used to investigate
changes in the R&D budget, increased availability of personnel and/
or facilities, and sensitivity to any of the input estimates. If the con-
straints on personnel and/or facilities are binding and more funds are
available, then the manager may investigate renting or procuring
additional personnel or facilities.
Some optimization techniques solve for the funding level of pro-
jects rather than simply determining which projects are to' be included.
(See Brandenberg and Stedry, ref. B-5. ) In the model presented, the
funding level is based on the definition of the projects as project
alternatives, where the alternatives may be similar projects at differ-
ent funding levels with differences in probability of success or other
characteristics. The funding level is determined by the cost estimates
of the alternatives rather than by the model.
The model is entirely dependent on the availability of the esti-
mates of potential military value. These estimates are applied
subjectively in the current review process. If the values of current
forces or capabilities (the E^ ) are supplied, they will provide a
o
valuable yardstick for the estimates of future project value, and add
greatly to the overall consistency of the estimates. The model is
further limited by the use of expected values, but will accept esti-
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x. = project i, i = 1, • r • , n projects
,
x = projects k, r; k & r independent indices for the n projects
V. = potential military value of project i
E. = expected military effectiveness of project i,= }_e..
JE^ = value of current equivalent of project i
d = incremental expected value obtained from including projects i
and k
C. - total cost of i project, adjusted for reliability goal
RC. = R&D cost of i project
R = total R&D activity budget
p. n - personnel in category A required for project i in time increment t
i it
P q = total personnel available in categoryx in time increment t
f
.
= facilities in category m required for project i in time increment t
lmt
F = total facilities available in category m in time increment t
mt
n = number of projects
N = program time horizon
L = number of personnel categories




Y = groups of alternative projects for same specific goal
Y = number of groups of alternative projects for same specific
goal
s = number of parallel development paths permitted
g = number of parallel development projects permitted
0. = probability that project i will be successfully completed
* 1
v: = reliability estimate for project i
SC. = total system cost for project i
IOC. = investment, operating, and support costs for project i
IOCi = replacement, operating, and support costs for continuing
current equivalent of project i
K = proportionality constant to convert military values to dollars
Z = number of specific objectives in which parallel development
is considered
Z = group of projects for which potential parallel development is
is considered




The model attempts to quantify the considerations which go into
the existing subjective program formulation. Unfortunately it is
rather difficult to solve. A linear programming problem with (0, 1)
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constraints on the variables has been solved by Balas. His
algorithm is based on a combinatorial approach which starts with all
n variables at and tests a small part of the 2 combinations to
determine an optimal solution or indicate that none exists. It can
be used to approximate the solution of a similar quadratic program.
It may be possible to modify this approach and combine it with
decomposition techniques applied to the other constraints to obtain a
solution. There are several other approaches that may be fruitful.
By redefining the variables to include combinations of projects, the
problem may be written as a linear programming model. Some sort
of redefinition of variables will probably be necessary to solve the
parallel development model, since as written it is considerably
more difficult.
For an immediately applicable solution, the manager can define
several "good" feasible programs and compute the objective functions
for each. Careful examination of the results may indicate places
where improvements may be made on program definitions. Another
possibility is the elimination of the quadratic expression from the
objective function, making a direct conversion to the modified linear





As estimating techniques become more refined, a further modi-
fication of the model may be desirable and possible. Constraints 1,
2, and 3 may be combined in a single cost restraint such as:
Y. [ RC (general) + RC (personnel) + RC (facilities)] 2 R
i
where RC (personnel) = cost of research personnel required for
project i in period t
RC (facilities) = cost of facilities required for project
i in period t
RC (general) = other R&D costs for project i in
period t
R = total R&D budget i&i period t
This form of cost constraint must be used with caution, however,
since it may imply a non-existent ease of acquiring additional
personnel and facilities.
The sequencing of projects and a more accurate time preference
may be introduced in-the objective function. This requires accurate
estimates of project value in each year, accurate estimates of the
operational date of the end product, and accurate estimates of project
time horizon and salvage value. All of these are difficult to obtain.
The constraints above require "units" of research, personnel, and
facilities, and the number of units of each type required for each
project. These numbers and unit definitions have caused difficulties
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The discount rate r should probably be kept small to avoid the bias
toward quick-return projects. Risk should continue to be accounted
for with the probability of success and reliability functions.
Without this modification, the program is more heavily dependent
on the evaluation phase "project" definition. As the inputs p. . and
f. L are defined, the anticipated possible starting times for thelmt r r 6
project must be built into the alternatives. Procedures to assist this
process are outlined in the next chapter.
Additional Optimization and Estimating Techniques
The model presented in the preceding section is designed to
approximate the current selection process and to include the major
selection criteria. Numerous models for project selection have been
proposed, some of them differing widely in approach from that
presented. This section will briefly review a representative sample
of other selection procedures.
The industrial dynamics approach to research and development
places heavy emphasis on rates: the flow of effort, information, and
payments. The recognition of the sequential decision process is its
major advantage. Some very interesting aspects of the project life
cycle are investigated and areas offering the greatest potential for
improvement are identified. Roberts' program for the project life
cycle employs some 200 variable equations, 40 initial conditions and
equations, and about 70 constants; many of the relationships are
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more subjective and more difficult to quantify than those in the model
t + v, * 103of the previous section.
In 1959, the Naval Research Advisory Committee suggested a
model for the discovery and application of knowledge based on differ-
ential equations expressing the rates at which the transitions occur
from the unknown, to known-but-not-applied knowledge, to applied
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fact. Their model was reasonably successful in curve-fitting
completed projects, but it suffers from the same difficulties as
Lanchester's equations. It is very difficult to determine a priori
the quantities which will determine the rates of progress, and until
these estimates become dependable, the technique is of little use.
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The linear programming formulation presented by Steessl
for basic research project selection depends on the definition of a
unit of research, assumes that output will be directly proportional
to input for all projects, and that projects are independent. The
only constraints are cost/budget constraints. Homogeneity of
personnel and facilities are assumed. Shaller's procedure for
evaluating the contribution of each project to each objective was
employed.
103
A- 14, pp 5-30.
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Other models are entirely subjective. Wilcox modified
Asbury's presentation to include projects in the order of their value
U, U = QAC + B, where Q = quality and novelty of the project; A =
appropriateness, or utility and usefulness of the project; C =
communications; and B = bias, which includes any other character-
istic that the manager may consider significant.
Some models used by industry for project selection may be
adapted for military use as "rules of thumb. " Two examples are
K 1 10?given below.
CTS x CCS x AV x Pj x /T?
TPC
Project value index PVI =
Index of relative worthT = 2
The input values are defined as follows:
CTS = probability of technical success
CCS = probability of commercial success
AV = annual volume of sales; units sold
P, = profit per unit
L = product life in years
TPC = total project cost
P2 = probability of attainment of commercial goal
N = estimated net return- -five years
C = estimated future research cost
Brandenberg and Stedry present a model which is also primarily
industry oriented and maximizes the funds available to the firm at
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dollar return to the firm, and borrowing between branches of the
firm is permitted at selected lending and borrowing rates.
Charnes and Stedry have developed a chance-constrainted
program for "optimal real-time control of research funding" which
109
appears to have an excellent potential. The demand for research
is assumed to be known, except for unpredictable changes resulting
from operating emergencies or technological breakthroughs. The
program perturbs conditions existing at the time of the breakthrough
or emergency and computes the required reallocation of effort. It is
designed for short-run modifications. A more detailed description





Chapter 6. Management Display and Program Control
All philosophers find
Some favourite system to their mind.
In every point to make it fit
Will force all nature to submit.
J. L. Peacock
"Headlong Hall"
The philosophy employed in these chapters is to avoid forcing
the Navy to submit to a model and instead require the model to fit
Navy R&D. As work is completed, facilities and personnel become
available for new projects. The manager reviews the reports on a
number of alternatives to select the ones to be undertaken. The
model accepts the primary characteristics of the alternatives as
inputs, combines this information with the facilities
,
funds, and
personnel available, and computes the alternatives to be included in
the program based on the approximate expected military worth of
the proposals.
Iterations can be performed as additional personnel and facilities
become available, and the planned program can be outlined as far in
advance as the timing estimates permit. It is desirable to perform
advanced iterations even when the manager is concerned only with
the immediate selection. It may reveal that a major increase in
A-9, Chapter 9.
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potential results from waiting for more personnel and facilities,
indicating that a temporary increase of personnel assigned to phase
I and II evaluation is desirable. The model will readily accept changes
in projects caused by breakthroughs or unexpected difficulties.
The model requires and produces a great deal of information
that is difficult to grasp without* a visual presentation. The evalua-
tion system described provides consistently derived information on
the alternatives. The manager must keep track of all current pro-
jects and the times at which additional facilities and personnel will
become available. This chapter suggests a procedure to simplify
this task.
PERT
The TDP procedures require that PERT diagrams, or similar
scheduling presentations, be developed for each project. This
chapter is concerned with the R&D portion of the PERT diagram.
The procurement portion and the problem of putting the end item
into operation are developed for use elsewhere in the planning
organization. A summary of the availability of facilities and pers-
sonnel can be included with the PERT diagrams. The project PERT
diagrams show the interrelationships of various phases of project
development, and the expected time required for completion.
PERT/ TIME techniques employ a modified beta distribution based
on the most likely, worst possible, and best possible times to
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completion. The interrelationships of development activities and the
time estimates are combined to indicate expected project completion
time and to identify the "critical path(s)".
The system has been criticized for its optimistic estimates and
reliance on expected values. The PERT tendency to underestimate
is probably not significant in'comparison with the errors in R&D time
estimates. The tendency may result from estimating errors rather
than the PERT computations even in areas where the uncertainty is
less pronounced than in R&D. There are techniques available which
modify PERT computations to account for the variance of activity
completion (e. g. , the Clark Bias Technique), but again, the errors
in the R&D estimates make the required increase in computational
difficulty unjustifiable. With or without the optimistic PERT errors,
the diagram and computations tell the manager which activities
require special, attention. This is the greatest contribution of the
system; it guides the project manager in allocating effort within the
project.
It has been observed that PERT is seldom used on small projects
(under $10, 000), Hardy presents a forceful argument for using PERT
on much smaller projects. He computes the cost of employing PERT/
TIME as about 0. 1% for large projects and between 1. 0% and 2. 0%
for small projects. For projects involving less than 15-20 activi-
ties, the initial computations may be made quite easily and quickly
111
B-27, pp 3, 14.
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by hand, eliminating the cost of solving the problem by computer.
Progress can be indicated on the initial diagram and this presentation
can be used in controlling project activity without additional computer
runs. The information contained in the PERT presentation is essen-
tial to project decisions, and PERT is a simple and useful way of
keeping track of the information.
To increase the value of PERT to the activity manager, the
utilization of facilities and personnel may be appended to the project
activities, or that information may be presented in summary form
omitting the internal reassignment of personnel and use of facilities.
A sample display containing this information is shown below.
PftoTBcT lOj
Availability
Personnel type 1 -10







PERT /TIME and Resource Availability
A modification of PERT techniques to permit inclusion of alter
native paths to completion, not all of which must be traversed, has
been developed by Dr. L. M. Crumley and M. A. Wilson at the
Re-entry Systems Department of General Electric. The technique
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Figure 6- 1
PERT /TIME and Resource Availability
A modification of PERT techniques to permit inclusion of alter
native paths to completion, not all of which must be traversed, has
been developed by Dr. L. M. Crumley and M. A. Wilson at the
Re-entry Systems Department of General Electric. The technique
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is called ARMNET, for Availability, Reliability, Maintainability
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Network Evaluation Techniques. It is useful when all the courses
of action required for completion cannot be determined with complete
certainty. In addition to time distributions, each activity has asso-
ciated with it a conditional probability of traversal. (In conventional
PERT, all traversal probabilities are 1. 0.)
ARMNET is a computerized Monte Carlo simulation. The pro-
gram first checks the consistency of the inputs and then proceeds
through the networks. Arcs are selected at random from the traver-
sal probabilities and times are selected at random from the activity
time distribution. When a node is occupied via two or more arcs, the
longer path is used. When the terminal mode is reached, the total
network passage time and path taken are recorded. The process is
then repeated a specified number of times to obtain the distribution
113
of project completion times. Attempts are being made to obtain
an analytical solution to replace the Monte Carlo technique.
A similar variation of PERT was developed by Eisner specifi-
cally for scheduling R&D projects. The transition probabilities
are used to determine the entropy of the system and indicate the
relative likelihood of proceeding to completion via various paths.










The PERT diagram not only provides essential management
information but also assists the evaluators in phase II in making
their cost and time estimates. It can be used to determine manpower
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requirements by skill and time period. Another modification of
PERT has been presented by Freeman to evaluate the effect of changes
in end product design specifications. The technique, DESM (Devel-
opment Evaluation and Specification Modification System), combines
network and statistical analysis, and utilizes specification versus
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time trade offs. The potentials of PERT and other network
analysis techniques are great, and further exploration of this area
can be expected to provide increasingly effective management aids.
Tree Diagrams
The use of tree diagrams in R&D planning has also been advo-
cated by several authors. Stoodley recommends it for displaying the
successive reduction of an operational need into technological support
requirements as a means of increasing the sensitivity of the research
117program to the problems of the operating forces. Hill extends
the use of the tree diagram to display progress of projects toward
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applied research and exploratory development, and the more general
definition of objectives in these areas may make the tree diagram
preferable to PERT. The PERT diagrams contain additional valuable
information, however, and if this information is available in these
categories, contributions to objectives may be computed by the model
(E. = Y e..) and displayed with the PERT presentation.
Some graphical techniques for displaying interdependencies are
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provided by Brandenburg and Stedry. Their dichotomy of
"research" (R.) and "development" (D.) projects is retained in the
summary below, but the interpretation can be applied to any events
or categories.
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**" D.
-»• D,
D , D , and D are facilitated by R: R --^^ —




Either R or R will facilitate D :
1 c 1 R.
rj^-D,
R
Both R and R are required for D :
1 Z 1 R






These techniques may be combined with the tree diagrams to provide
additional information on the project relationships.
Mult i-PERT
The individual project PERT diagrams may be combined by the
activity manager to obtain a display of his entire program, and the
combined project jitilization of facilities and personnel provide
directly the constraints on facilities and personnel. The dependence
of projects can be displayed, including parallel development efforts.
A simple example of the combined presentation is presented in
Figure 6-2. The information on the contribution to objectives has
been added to this figure.
As the projects are completed, the personnel assigned are
shifted to phase I evaluation, and personnel already in phase I and II
are assigned to new projects. Facilities become available and are
scheduled for use by new projects. The "plus" figures in the
personnel availability list indicate decision points. Using the avail-
ability input figures, the model selects the projects to be included in
the program and the selected projects are then added to the display.
The availability of funds can be included in the summary information.
The plot could be made on absolute time units to improve the visual
presentation, but frequent revisions of the estimates can be antici-
pated. This would require modifications of the entire drawing. It
is more practical to approximate the time scale for the initial draw-
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The project interrelationships in Figure 6-2 are as follows.
Project #4 depends on successful completion of activity h of project
#2. Project #4 consists of two alternative approaches to improve
the chances of attaining its high military value. Successful comple-
tion along either path will permit project #6 to commence. Projects
#5 and #7 are independent of the information sought by previous
projects and await only the availability of personnel and facilities.
Project #8 requires successful completion of #3 in order to start,
and activity f of #8 depends on completion of activity g of #5.
"Modern Miser" is a similar planning and scheduling tool
developed at the Navy's David Taylor Model Basin which warrants
study for possible application to the R&D program. It was designed
to model naval shipyard operations and uses a basic critical path
method. Other features are a cost optimization routine, a procedure
for allocating slack time among activities, a man-power leveling
120
process, and a method for scheduling resource allocation. Its
major drawback is its deterministic nature, but it is possible- -for
added programming time and cost --to run multiple iterations using
ranges of input variables to gain more information on the set of
feasible programs. Revisions to the program to accept the R&D
uncertainties would be preferable.
The selection model and the multi-PERT display are mutually




aware of development problems. This provides the model input for
revised definitions of current projects. As projects near completion
the estimates of availability of personnel and facilities can be made
accurately. This provides the model input constraints on funds,
personnel and facilities. The model inputs on proposed projects and
their interrelationships are available from the TDP. (A modification
of the TDP to make the model inputs more easily obtainable is pre-
sented in the next chapter. )
Once these model inputs have been obtained, the computations
are made and the revised program is read out. The printout of
model computations can include total program effectiveness, the
individual project contributions, and the total contributions to func-
tional objectives (the E.) such as ASW, AAW, close air support, etc.
This information can be reviewed for program balance. The review
may indicate the need to shift effort, and another model iteration can
be made, deleting some of the less important selected projects from
the admissable set.
When satisfactory balance is obtained- -and few changes for
balance are anticipated- -the model output of selected projects can
then be added to the multi-PERT display. The process may be
repeated as breakthroughs are achieved or as unexpected problems
are encountered. The modified TDP states project interrelation-
ships, anticipated project problems, and project dependence on
breakthroughs. This information may be used to update the probability
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of success in projects effected by the breakthroughs and problems.
The frequency of these events in the R&D process requires many
program revisions, and much time can be saved by introducing a
numerical and computerized computation of program and project
effectiveness.
The model can be used for annual program formulation and
longer- range planning
, as well as for interim adjustments. It can
be used to investigate the effect of budget changes and to compute
program changes required by SECDEF and Congress. These revi-
sions must be made rapidly, again emphasizing the advantages of
having a mathematical program selection technique available.
Since the model has been designed for use at the activity level,
it cannot be used to directly compute the Navy-wide program reallo-
cation. But by running the program for a sequence of increasing
budget reductions, the loss of effectiveness can be determined at
each activity. This information should be useful in determining
where to make budget cuts. The problem of redefining some projects
should also be considered. The new alternate solutions and the old
ones which were not selected in previous iterations provide for new
program formulation. These computations can be made in advance
of Congressional and DoD review. It may be desirable to forward
this information with the proposed budget requests to give Congress
and DoD an indication of the effect of anticipated cuts. The consistency
of this procedure depends on promulgation of objectives by the top
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levels of management and subsequent discussion of these values
within the Navy. There is a continuing requirement for review of
these E. and Ej values, and this review is going on today in subjec-
tive terms to appraise the effectiveness of Navy efforts in a changing
environment. The attempt to quantify the subjective evaluation is
necessary to relieve top management of the responsibility for study-
ing every detail of the R&D program.
It may be helpful to review the top management control of the
R&D process in this context. Briefly, CNO outlines capabilities and
goals. The R&D community responds with PTA's or similar docu-
ments, which are reviewed by CNO. If the PTA looks promising, a
more specific requirement is established and a TDP is written. The
review process is repeated. Approved projects are reviewed twice
annually thereafter, or more often for major projects in difficulty.
The procedures place very heavy demands on top management,
particularly in the early stages.
It may be possible to substantially decrease these demands
without reducing effectiveness. It has already been argued at some
length that current procedures attempt to acquire too much informa-
tion before it can be evaluated with the accuracy desired for decision-
making. Armed with detailed values of current and proposed
capabilities, the activity managers can make the preliminary
decisions efficiently and effectively. Based on the TDP results, the
manager can propose an R&D program for his activity and forward
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the program for approval, accompanied by the TDP's. This would
reduce the time and extent of the review, permit a comparison of
projects which can increase the consistency of the review, and provide
the review at a time when a reasonable basis for decision has been
established.
Management should not be left in the dark between program
reviews, however. The reporting procedures should be used during
project formulation to keep management informed. The types of
reports desired for control or for general information are quite
similar. The use of the modified TDP form suggested in Chapter 7
would satisfy both needs and hence permit "management by exception"
in the earlier stages as well. Returning the reports to the originat-
ing activity with comments on military value of the proposed or
active projects could increase feedback and the accuracy and consis-
tency of the value estimates. Suggestions for modification of alter-
nate project definitions could also be included in the management
reaction to the project reports.
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Chapter 7. Flexibility of Control
The source of most of the more fashionable management
techniques is the aerospace industry of the United States.
A list. . . contains some fifty techniques from ABLE
(Activity Balance L_ine Evaluation) to WHISIT (Where in
the Hell IS IT ? ). It was only a lack of published informa-




Hardy's comment serves to put the discussion of the last two
chapters in perspective. The selection model and the multi-PERT
program summary were not included because they are fashionable
things to talk about, and the thesis was not written merely as a
vehicle to convey them. They were included because they are use-
ful techniques for R&D management. The model is a reasonable
approximation of subjective project selection procedures and may
be used for long-range planning and for immediate reallocation of
resources required by breakthroughs or emergencies. The
multi-PERT concept makes use of information that is already
required for the TDP, and provides valuable information for the
activity manager- -whether he uses the selection model or not. Both
the model and multi-PERT recognize and emphasize the dynamic





The control functions require that data on projects in progress
be periodically updated; this is currently done with the TDP's.
Criteria estimates become more accurate as work progresses. The
revised estimates must be recorded and projects re-defined as work
progresses. The necessary information is readily available and no
additional reports are required, although some modification and
simplification of current reports may be helpful. The model may
be used to compute program revisions resulting from changes in
military value, cost estimates, reliability, probability of success,
and project duration. The model could be programmed to compute
the merit of projects omitted from the recommended R&D program
to indicate to the manager the advisability of contracting some pro-
jects or acquiring additional personnel or facilities. Much of the
control of the activity's program can be handled in the framework
of the model and multi-PERT, but there are other considerations
which are discussed in this chapter.
Modern research administration has become a very complicated
and time-consuming process. The danger in control is that it can
easily develop into over-planning, which can so wrap the process in
red tape that the activity spends all its time planning and control-
ling and none doing. The observation has been made of some
civilian institutions that an increasing amount of research is being




climb the status pyramid of science administration. This criti-
cism is not as widely applicable as others, and it can be controlled
by recognizing the problem, clearly assigning administrative respon-
sibility, and encouraging teamwork.
A major administrative requirement is standardization. Cost
analyses must use well-defined and uniform costs in order for the
program inputs to be consistent. There must be standardized
measurement of project values, and this can be provided by top
management in the form of E- values. The reporting procedures
o
should be standardized to provide ease of evaluation and review of
projects from different activities. Introducing complex procedures
to provide the standardization can cause more problems than benefits,
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and the procedures could be kept as simple as possible.
Administrative decisions can be reached more quickly be reduc-
ing the number of coordinating and reviewing units, as well as by
standardizing and simplifying the reporting procedures. The bilinear
structure of the Navy organization tended to increase the frequency
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of review, but the May 1966 reorganization moved the Navy closer
to a unilinear structure. It has been suggested here that the amount
of review from above of the R&D projects in the formulativre stages








keep decisions at levels having more familiarity with the problems,
thus providing top management with more time to make major
decisions.
Another reason for reducing the amount of top-level review is
that the information desired for the top-level decision does not
become available until later in the process. The further away
from the work level that decisions are made, the more difficult it
is to communicate a feeling for subjective aspects such as the pro-
bability of success. The attempt to provide information that is not
available and the attempt to provide a full understanding of subjective
evaluations both increase the time required to prepare what may be
a misleading report. The report will also be longer than necessary
and thereby increase the time required for review. The sequence of
changes in project value, costs, difficulties, and timing estimates
requires additional communications and causes an "understanding
lag, " again increasing the desirability of making the decisions at
the working level. Similar criticism has been directed at the Navy's
retention of the right to evaluate the wisdom of expenditures and the
125
efficiency of effort in contracted projects. In this case the Navy
must keep that right to protect its own interests, but a reduction of
the organization level at which the decisions are made may be
possible.
125
A-14, pp 15-19; B-66, pp 5-6.
i78
In a study of control procedures used in industrial and institu-
tional research and development, Hill found considerable variety in
type and quality. The better control programs contained the follow-
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ing features:
(1) total funding authorization
(2) total planned vs. actual man-hours and labor costs, by type
(3) total planned vs. expended materials, by type
(4) indicated overrun
(5) forecast vs. actual completion dates
(6) explanations for deviations from predictions
The techniques used to make the predictions should be included in
this list.
Activity management should use the information provided to
detect potential applications of value analysis and value engineering
that may have been overlooked. The activity managers should be
permitted to approve or disapprove most of the Value Engineering
Change Proposals (VECP) and incorporate thier own changes, report-
ing the action taken rather than submitting the proposals for sequential
review. In the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installa-
tions and Logistics) the average time required for processing VECP's
was "reduced" (!) to less than forty-five (45) days. The reduction
was looked upon quite proudly, although effort was still being devoted
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long time, and the Navy should be able to do better even in the major
changes for which review at top levels is required.
Special attention to transitions between projects can also speed
the R&D process. The combined use of the model and the multi-
PERT display facilitate planning for the transition. In the late stages
of project development, accurate estimates on completion time and
the availability of facilities and personnel can be made. The person-
nel and facilities employed usually decrease in stages as completion
is approached, and new teams can be successively built up to under-
take the next project. If the practice of assigning some personnel
to the phase I and II planning and literature review is followed, the
transition is facilitated and the new teams can be ready to use the
facilities as soon as they become available. By maintaining a
consistently high level of activity, much can be done to eliminate
11, 'A 128slack periods.
The resource management system and project PRIME encourage
managers to use accounting and budgeting procedures as controls
rather than regard them as necessary bookkeeping evils. The
Comptroller's Office can provide valuable assistance in making and
updating cost estimates, and can give the manager the full measur-
able cost of his operations. Two of the goals of project PRIME are
to eliminate the "budget ceiling effect" and the once-a-year approach
to funding problems. The "budget ceiling effect" encouraged heavy
B-64, pp 1
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use of new starts. Full funding requirements for the new starts
would not become apparent until later years when funding require-
ments exceeded the planned budgets. It also created a separation of
budgeting and military planning. The annual budget cycle tends to be
an annual rush, depriving managers of the time needed for adequate
review. This emphasizes the need to combine budgeting and mili-
tary planning on a year-round basis. It is interesting to note that
the programming techniques which modified the budget review have
not been without problems--in a revision of the numbered programs,
the Military Assistance Program had to be omitted from the compu-
ter evaluation for lack of a tenth digit for what had become the tenth
129program.
A financial and estimating problem that occurs in contracting
work is the tendency of competitive bidding to produce highly opti-
mistic cost estimates. This problem is receiving considerable
attention, and the type of contracts awarded has been shifting from
"cost plus fixed fee" to "fixed fee with incentives. " It would be very
helpful to attach some of the incentive to improvements in estimating
techniques. This could improve estimates and increase the believ-
ability of contract bids.
The characteristic problems and breakthroughs of the R&D
»
process require a large measure of flexibility. This is one of the
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reasons why previous chapters have stressed the need for clearly
identifying anticipated problems and dependence on breakthroughs in
project reports. In monitoring current projects the manager can
give added attention to these critical points and be prepared to make
adjustments. One means of adjustment which is available in excep-
tional conditions is the Secretary of Defense Emergency Fund. This
fund contains $125, 000, 000 to $150, 000, 000 for RDT&E projects.
This constitutes a realistic recognition of the uncertainties of R&D,
and while no transfer may exceed 7% of the total, the $10, 000, 000
130
should provide a good start for most projects. Other indications
for program re-evaluation are the loss or acquisition of key research
personnel, new information in the field of interest, changes in goals,
131
and the availability of new facilities.
Personnel management is as important in R&D activities as in
any other field, and the flexibility requirements of the program give
it added emphasis. It has been estimated that a 30% annual turnover
of personnel results in job-changing and retraining losses which
reduce the -activity' s effectiveness by 20%. Unfortunately the mana-
ger must have considerable flexibility in making personnel assign-
ments to cope with scheduling problems and the differences in R&D
project size. This requirement conflicts with the desire of many








that have become experienced in working together. The
researchers must learn to accept frequent re-assignment and jour-
neys to other activities and the operating forces to exchange infor-
mation. The activity managers require this type of flexibility to
operate their program efficiently. The increased use of scientists
and engineers in planning and evaluation may improve their under-
standing of these management problems, and the similar increased
mobility requirements in industry should also decrease personnel
turnover.
The control of R&D effort is basically a communications problem.
The dynamic nature of R&D makes it impossible to apply the control
at single points in time and at a single point in the organization. The
uncertainty inherent in R&D produces a sequence of revised estimates
for each project, and rapid communication of the revisions to the
activity manager is absolutely essential to efficient control. The
classification process permits early identification of interdependen-
cies and formulation of lines of communication for specific projects.
The evaluation process reveals requirements for support from other
activities to advance the state of the art, and in some cases the
entire project may be reassigned. The results of completed- -or
cancelled- -projects must be promulgated to the subsequent develop-
ment activities to permit application of the knowledge, and
132
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promulgated to the chain of command and operating forces to
obtain additional insight into the military applications.
The information may be exchanged on an informal basis, but it
should be followed up by formal documentation. The same types of
information are required for classification, evaluation, control, and
informative review. Differences occur only in the amount of infor-
mation available and desired. It therefore appears most reasonable
and desirable to use similar or identical forms in all phases. The
TDP summary report represents the first step in this direction.
Additional information can be filled in at each step in the project's
development; the form can be designed to accept successive revisions
of estimates without deleting the initial estimates; top management
can quickly determine which portions are of interest- -and if additional
information is desired, most of it will be right there. The informa-
tion included on the report will differ in type and amount with the
program category. Figure 7-1 suggests a possible format for the
report and lists the information to be included. Some of the cate-
gories permit entries from the top-level review and thereby increase
system- feedback.
The responses of top management officials in industry to an
opinion survey on reports to management indicated that the following
133improvements were desired:
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32% more stress on long-term implications
32% more stress on dollar implications of findings
22% shorter reports
21% more graphic material
13% less scientific
11% more stress on new product implications
The form suggested in Figure 7-1 scores well on these points, and
the 22% who want shorter reports should be ecstatic. The survey is
ten years old, but judging from the current literature on R&D, it is
still applicable. The increased work load in R&D has probably
increased most of the percentages more rapidly than improvements
could be made.
One reason for the wordiness and great volume of reports may
be the mistaken feeling that unless all thoughts which occurred in
project evaluation are reproduced in the report, the expense of the
study cannot be justified. The final reports often appear to be
project work books, rewritten in the best prose. This is not only
unnecessary in reports, but undesirable as well. The workbook
can be kept (but not rewritten) and should be of continuing use through-
out project development.
The value of a centralized control point, or more accurately--
centralized coordinating point--was suggested in discussing the
classification process. Control and review for program balance
would also be well served by a centralized coordinating office. R&D
category review is currently performed by CNR, CND, and DCNO(D)
and CNO, ASN(R&D), and SECNAV perform subsequent review.
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Figure 7- 1
Multi-purpose R&D Project Reporting Form
Page Contents
1, Administrative information. Project title, category; date
and location of entry into system and source of proposal.
Activity and key personnel assigned; phone number. Brief
statement of problem.
Problem definition. Full description of problem. Objectives;
potential military applications and value. Characteristics of
end item. Value of current capability. Prior related studies
consulted. Revisions, dates, and reasons.
3. Outline of alternative technological approaches. Revisions,
dates, and reasons.
4, PERT diagram with time estimates, and R&D requirements
for personnel and facilities. Revisions, dates, and reasons.
4A, B, . . . Repeat for alternative approaches ("project definitions. ")
5. Cost summary: total system and subsystem. R&D, procure-
ment, operating, maintenance, and support costs. Costs for
current capability. Revisions, dates, and reasons.
5A, B, . . . Cost estimation worksheet, indicating basis for estimates and
more detailed cost breakdown if required. Revisions, dates,
and reasons.
6. List hard-to-measure costs shown on pp . Indicate which
are significant, why, and whether estimates have been
included. Revisions, dates, and reasons.
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Figure 7-1 (continued)
Multi-purpose R&D Project Reporting Form
Page Contents
7. Reliability goals for system and subsystems. Revisions,
dates, and reasons.
7A,B,... Reliability test requirements, methods, and results,
8. Description of specific problem areas, reliance on break-
throughs. Probability of success. Revisions, dates, and
reasons.
9, Project interrelationships. Incremental values of pairs of
projects. Revisions, dates, and reasons.
10. List of all assumptions. Discussion of effect on project.
Revisions, dates, and reasons.
11, Trade offs in terms of alternative project definitions:
cost-time-reliability-probability of success-personnel
required-facilities required-potential value. Revisions,
dates, and reasons.
12. Remarks on any unusual circumstances pertinent to project
selection or development. Dates.
13, Recommendations; conclusions; objectives achieved.
Dissenting opinions. Revisions, dates, and reasons.
187
A small group of personnel could provide bookkeeping services for
this review by combining the activity multi-PERT presentations
and the report forms suggested in the previous paragraph. This
would reduce the review to evaluation and decision-making; the
bookkeeping should not be included in the review by top levels of
management. The same office could be used for both the initial
classification and final arrangement of projects for review. The
combined report is designed to facilitate review by top-level
management, but it can be almost as valuable to each R&D activity
by providing a convenient and informative summary of what is going
on in other activities.
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Chapter 8. Program Feedback and Evaluation
Today is the outcome of yesterday's research and
invention; and one can perceive the future unrolling
in the technology of the present.
Dr. William A. Hamor
Senior Director of Research
Mellon Institute 134
The lack of a well-developed data bank to support project plan-
ning has been mentioned frequently in this presentation. Some of
the techniques proposed will require new measurements and new
data. There is much valuable information in the history of projects
that could be used to evaluate and improve management planning-
-
valuable information that is currently receiving a frightening lack
of attention. These subjects are discussed in this chapter.
Data Bank
A great deal of data is needed to estimate various costs, time
requirements, reliability and other project characteristics. Much
data has already been collected and many estimating relationships
have been derived. The NARDIS data system discussed in Chapter 1,
the CNA CIRCUS (Cost Information Retrieval and Characteristics
135
Utilization System), and the computerized data evaluation system
134 A „A-7, pp 1.
B-45, pp 1-2,
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associated with the Pacific Missile Range are examples of activities
devoted to correcting the data deficiencies.
A major problem being attacked by these activities and others
is the inconsistency and lack of explanation of data. The quantifica-
tion of test results and observations reduces the information available
in the sense that unusual results and their causes become obscured
in statistical averages. Working with raw data can often uncover
such details, and the Operations Evaluation Group of CNA is current-
ly using this approach (albeit not completely by choice). But some
of the data now available suffers from a much more serious lack of
explanation. It is often impossible to determine what quantities
were measured. Poorly defined and completely undefined quantities
1 36
abound. Some statistical analyses are required to combine such
measurements from different sources, thus deriving estimating rela-
tionships for who -knows -what. And these peculiar combinations may
be all the planner has available for making his estimates.
Another major difficulty is that the concrete and measurable
variables are often unrelated to the effort required to get the job
137
done. This problem is most apparent in attempts to measure
the progress or output of R&D activities. The number of published
papers, the number of patents, the number of advanced degrees
held by activity personnel; all have been used to evaluate the
13




effectiveness of R&D activities. These elements are of some interest,
but the emphasis placed on them has distorted whatever measurement
value the quantities may have had.
The difficulty of identifying and measuring the critical variables
has caused them to be omitted from planning altogether in some
instances, omitted from computational models in most cases, and
omitted from post-operational evaluation almost universally. When
they are omitted from the final evaluation of an operable product or
system (when they theoretically could be measured rather than pre-
dicted), no information is acquired on which to base future estimates.
With no new information, the omissions will continue.
There are many instances when decisions have been based on
TOO
informal communications. The undocumented decisions provide
no basis for review at higher levels, and no basis for subsequent
analysis of the decision if the project goes awry or achieves unusual
success. Planning discontinuities arise during personnel turnover
in activities where this informal decision-making is practiced.
It is also necessary to develop estimating techniques which may
be applied early in project formulation. The critical variables and
estimating relationships will not be sufficient if they cannot be
accurately identified until midway through project development. It
was suggested earlier that the entire sequence of estimates be pre-
served and compared with the final measured costs. From this




estimating techniques which compensate for the large initial errors.
There are indications that the errors follow a general pattern. Some
studies have used error-averaging techniques based on symmetrical
distribution of estimates about the final project characteristics, but
the repeated underestimation of both cost and time requirements does
not warrant this assumption of symmetry.
A severe limitation of statistical analysis is that no matter how
accurate the data, and no matter how large the sample size, the results
are valid only over the observed range of variables. The need for extra-
polation is a fundamental characteristic of the R&D process. This
makes estimating much more difficult and uncertain. The engineering
evaluation of the project may provide enough insight into differences
between the project under consideration and the statistical average of
previous projects to permit more accurate estimates. To do this
consistently, it is necessary to document and explain the statistical
presentation. A record of individual projects of a particular type,
studied within a single activity, may be more useful than the statistical
combination of the projects. An example of this type of estimating
relationship is shown in Figure 8-1. Estimates of other project char-
acteristics could be plotted. Graphs such as these, combined with the
multi-purpose reports suggested in Chapter 7, can help the manager
convert engineering evaluations into percentage points of the distribu-
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Since there is a great deal of data required in a great number of
locations, it is reasonable to ask whether a centralized automated data
processing office is necessary. Centralization has been suggested in
the classification process and in collecting and sorting scheduled and
current projects from the various R&D categories for overall review.
NARDIS partially satisfies this requirement for data processing. In
this case, however, there are some excellent reasons for maintaining
the data at the activities, rather than in a central location. The activi-
ties which collect the data will generally have the greatest continuing
need for it. They have the best understanding of the data, and use it to
develop various estimating relationships. They can up-date the data
more conveniently and quickly if they retain it in their own files or
their own ADP system. There is also less danger of stripping the data
of its engineering information.
What is required is the promulgation of a consolidated list of the
types of data which are available. Several studies have been conducted
using very rough estimates of project characteristics on which a great
deal of recent, accurate, and useful data have been collected. The
responsibility for collecting and combining the activity data availability
lists could be assigned to the centralized coordinating office mentioned
previously. The combined list should be made available to all R&D
activities and all offices which undertake planning studies. The Comp-
troller's Office should review the activities' cost data, a service
prescribed in the Resource Management System.
194
The centralization of the data processing activity shifts the burden
of collection and communication and provides an integrated data system.
It should be made sensitive to the activity needs for estimating relation-
ships, and it may improve the estimating relationships by providing them
with a broader base. It also presents an opportunity to examine differ-
ences in performance among activities working on similar items.
New Data from Proposed Techniques
.
Perhaps the most interesting addition to the data bank is the infor-
mation on military values of projects and operational equipment. The
best place to start estimating these values is with operational systems
or components, on the assumption that it is easier to evaluate existing
equipment than to predict values of products in development. The values
of the existing capabilities serve as a yardstick for evaluating proposed
changes; a further measuring aid may be obtained by comparing cost
reduction projects with increased effectiveness projects. This would
place the military worth on an approximate dollar basis and establish
a means of estimating the value of K. These values are also needed
for planning allowance lists for shipboard spare parts.
The acquisition of this data in any form will provide an improved
measure of the return on R&D, a quantity which is sorely needed. The
suggested measure is the first portion of the objective function of the





form of the objective function can be refined to obtain d (d - d ),
this should also be included. An analysis of this measure by categories
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may provide quantitative information on the best allocation of effort
among the R&D categories, but the values must be assigned consis-
tently to achieve this. Unfortunately these measures are most difficult"
to make on basic research projects, where the need for allocation
guidance is greatest.
The values obtained over a period of time may also be used to
establish a cut-off value for inclusion of a project in the program. The
cut-off, or series of cut-off levels dependent on the existing workload
and the number of alternatives available for consideration, could be
used to reduce the computations required in the model. The repeated
use of these quantified subjective effectiveness measures should also
lead to improved estimates.
The data on facilities, personnel, funds, and time may be used to
improve estimates of these quantities, and ultimate to an evaluation of
the "best" or most efficient level of effort for project development.
These measurements may also be used to derive the probability of
success for a given level of effort. Retaining the full set of estimates
and revisions made for each project should also increase the accuracy
of estimates.
It has also been suggested here that the estimates and data be
retained for unsuccessful projects. Learning from previous mistakes
or unprofitable approaches is also valuable. It can eliminate unneces-
sary duplication of effort, identify past errors in technological efforts,
and uncover planning oversights and invalid assumptions.
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Post-Operational Evaluation.
The introductory quotation of this chapter is applicable not only to
the R&D projects but to the estimating and planning methodology used
to develop the projects as well. The examination of yesterday's plans
and today's results can yield great improvement in today's plans and
tomorrow's results. Many volumes have been devoted to R&D efforts
and the gross estimates that are so common, but there has been
dangerously little analysis of the reasons for errors. The analysis
has been hindered by undocumented and undated changes in project
characteristics. Whether this analysis has simply not been undertaken,
or has been tried unsuccessfully, or has been completed successfully
and the results withheld, has not been determined. The analysis is
difficult to perform, and may require a considerable delay, but it is
nonetheless indispensable. Post-operational evaluation of the planning
and estimating techniques, technological and administrative methods,
and promulgation of the results, a'rje vital. Without theit}, the elements of
mythpgraphy will continue to multiply, the estimates will continue to
be inaccurate, and time-consuming project, changes will continue to
disrupt the R&D program.
A distinction is made here between test and evaluation of the end
products , which is being conducted in some detail, and the evaluation
of the data used for estimates, the procedures and relationships used
to derive the relationships, and the techniques employed in analysis
from scenario to project selection to project completion. The gap may
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be partially closed by increasing communications between OEG and
similar groups and the rest of the R&D community, but the scope of
the evaluation must also be extended.
Data are not collected for the sole purpose of filling out the data






and how to prevent their
recurrence
. It should also be used to identify exceptional success in
predictions and development
,
and the reasons therefor
. There are
obvious deficiencies in current estimating techniques. A critical
analysis of planning and estimating techniques --an analysis based on
study of the operational result of the project— is the only effective
means of improving the process. A simple increase in the amount of
data may never by itself achieve the desired results. No project should
be considered complete until this type of analysis has been performed.
For in-house projects, it is a relatively simple matter to state the
requirement for post-operational analysis of each activity's efforts by
that activity, and await the results. For work done for the Navy by
universities or industry, the contract should require review of the
operational results of the project to analyze the planning and estimating
efforts that went into the project. The importance of requiring a
critical final evaluation by the personnel who performed the work can-
not be overemphasized; they are the only ones who know exactly what
went on and why. The benefits continue. The analysis also provides
information for use in contractor selection. (The frankness and validity
198
of the final analysis can be considered as well as the degree of success
attained in the project. ) And the contractors can use the analysis to
make improvements in their future efforts- -improvements which they
might not otherwise attempt and improvements which they might not
otherwise recognize for lack of information on the final results of their
efforts.
Two procedures suggested earlier can make substantial contribu-
tions to the post-operational analysis. The multi-purpose R&D report-
ing form calls for the initial estimates, the date and reason for each
and every revision to each and every project characteristic, and the
final characteristics of the operational product. This records the
entire sequence of estimates and will help locate errors. The recom-
mended list of assumptions made in performing the study and develop-
ment provides an excellent starting point in determining the reasons
for the errors.
Evaluation of the completed product will provide information on
when simplifying assumptions can be made without introducing gross
errors. It may also be possible to identify areas where the assump-
tions introduce consistent and predictable errors, and this can be
equally valuable.
At the beginning of a project or study, the awareness of the final
analysis requirement may reduce the acceptance of doubtful premises
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attitude of constructive criticism, but the value is there and it may-
even surpass the more obvious benefits.
If the source of the data used is well documented in the report, it
may be possible to identify inaccuracies or inconsistencies in a parti-
cular data source, or information on the validity of extrapolations
performed, or a poor comparison between projects assumed to be
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similar. The information obtained from the post-operational
analysis of the project can be used to promptly up-date the data and
estimating relationships used.
Additional insight into the validity of the model can be obtained by
applying the model to the finished product characteristics and compar-
ing the model results with the actual. The analytical procedures used
,. . . 141 ,in prediction are not restricted to a single application, but attain
the most useful results when applied on a continuing basis. The rela-
tively simple process of making an additional computer run can check
out the final results and the accuracy of the model. The comparison
can isolate the error and eliminate it, or at least reduce it, and
improve future models and techniques.
A more difficult problem that can be addressed in the final evalua-
tion is the determination of the cause of improved estimates. Did
improvements come because the data bank was expanded and the pre-







techniques? Again, the reporting techniques suggested can make
this task somewhat easier.
It would be quite easy and appropriate to continue the discussion
of the post-operational analysis of R&D projects for at least a dozen
pages, but the point has been established. The after-the-fact evalua-
tion of R&D effort has not even scratched the surface of the wealth of
knowledge available, and further delay in its implementation would be
a gross dis-service to the entire program.
142
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Chapter 9. Summary and Program Consistency
"Chief Executive's Utterly Exact Method for Measuring Scientific
Research:
I multiply your projects by the words I can't pronounce,
And weigh your published papers to the nearest half ounce;
I add a healthy bonus for research that's really pure
(And if it's also useful, your job will be secure).
I integrate your patent rate upon a monthly basis
And I fugure what your plan in the race to conquer space is;
Your scientific stature I weigh upon some scales
Whose final calibration is the company's net-to- sales.
And so I create numbers where there were none before;
And thus have facts and figures and formulas galore --
And the volume of statistics make the whole thing very clear:
Our research should cost exactly what we've budgeted this year!
Ned Laudon
General Electric143
The preceding chapters have also generated numbers where there
were none before, but a stronger case has been presented for them
than can be made for the procedure outlined above. The numbers
required here are the E. and E- -- the military values of proposed
and existing capabilities. The information represented by these num-
bers is used extensively throughout the R&D process. Figure 9-1 is
a schematic summary of the R&D process.
RDT&E in the Navy is a very large and complex process. The
organization must deal with a tremendous variety of research and
development projects. The DoD Planning-Programming-Budgeting










organization. The trend appears to be toward conducting business
in terms of developing the scenario, formulating plans and policies,
converting the plans and policies., to the program and budget, and
executing and appraising the program. The functional activities are
coordinated at each phase. The programming and budgeting phase is
incorporated in the FYDP; it was observed that the FYDP includes
only those R&D projects which have been formally approved. Chapter
1 summarized important R&D elements in the organization, the plan-
ning documents, project development procedures, and reporting
documents.
The research and development process must deal with the future
--an uncertain future. The international and domestic political
situation is ever-changing. The objectives of the nation, DoD, and
ftie Navy change with the political situation and the advancement of
technology. The alternatives available to meet these objectives must
be sought out and evaluated. The evaluation must predict the charac-
teristics of the end product and the cost resources, and time required
to produce it. The successful output of the process is intentionally
designed to change the future that must be predicted. This uncertainty
greatly complicates the R&D manager's task of controlling the wide-
spread and decentralized organization's activities. Chapter 2 discusses
some of the organizational techniques which have been employed to
cope with this problem, and the communications problems which have
arisen. Chapters 1 and 2 describe the nature of the problem addressed.
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There are three characteristics of the research and development
process which overshadow all others. Two have already been men-
tioned: complexity and uncertainty. The third is the dynamic nature
of the process. There are no static decision points. There is no
one point in time where projects submit themselves for an orderly
review and one -shot program formulation, although the annual Congres-
sional budget review requires both. An effective R&D program can
be attained only if the review and program formulation are constantly
being updated. The order of topic presentation was based on the life
cycle of an individual project. Each of the phases discussed is
conducted on a year-'round basis with a sequence of projects.
Chapter 3 discusses project genesis. The current environment
and anticipated changes to it are expressed in a scenario. The inputs
to the scenario are the general objectives of the nation, DoD, and
Navy; predicted and current threats, commitments, and capabilities;
and anticipated advances in technology. In addition to the political and
military considerations, the scenario addresses the availability of
manpower and other resources. A year-by-year breakdown of expected
events is the most useful form for the presentation, even if the time
estimates must be crude.
The scenario is used to formulate plans and more specific objec-
tives. The planning documents were described in detail in Chapter 1.
They attempt to outline force levels and capabilities well into the
future. It is desirable to include indications of the relative importance
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of these capabilities. The NRO, EDG, and GOR/TSOR are developed
from the planning documents. Quantification of the subjective relative
importance of the capabilities is most useful at this point. These
documents in turn give rise to project proposals.
Under the present conditions, most R&D proposals originate within
the R&D community in response to these documents. While the present
number of projects is sufficient to keep the R&D activities busy, it is
suggested that the search for alternative proposals be expanded. Some
proposals are received from industry and the universities, and their
proposal input could be increased by providing a list of topics in which
the Navy has a particular current interest. A direct "input from the
fleet could greatly increase the sensitivity of the Navy's research and
development to existing problems. It is simply not reasonable to
expect the top levels of the Navy organization to be familiar with all
operating problems being experienced by three-quarters of a million
men; it would be a physical impossibility even if the top management
had nothing else to do.
One source of fleet information is the increasing number of officers
with post-graduate training. The Navy makes a substantial investment
in their training and cannot afford to overlook any possible return on
that investment. But the P-coded officers are not the only potential
source of proposals. The efforts of OEG and similar operations research
activities are invaluable inputs. An informal "beneficial R&D sugges-
tion^ program could increase fleet-wide awareness of a responsibility
to seek improvements. This program would increase the relevance
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of the R&D effort, take better advantage of the Navy's training,
provide increased personal satisfaction for all participants, and
increase the chances of obtaining the best proposals.
The magnified search for alternatives should include a thorough
review of topic literature. Much effort can be conserved by determining
what has already been done to solve particular problems. The literature
search has itself become an unreasonably difficult problem. The
volume of printed matter is so great that a thorough search is prohibi-
tive without automated services similar to those provided by DDC but
on a much broader basis.
The more extensive search for problems and alternative solutions
requires classification to direct the information to the proper activities.
It is suggested that a centralized clearinghouse be designated for this
purpose. The clearinghouse would also assist existing procedures. It
would determine the activity best suited to address the proposals,
group related problems and proposals, and identify other project inter-
relationships to help establish early communications and coordination.
Concurrently with the classification, a very rough evaluation is
performed to identify proposals which have been proven to be unsat-
isfactory, or are unsafe, or would create more problems than they
could solve. The technological feasibility does not require detailed
engineering evaluation at this point, but merely a determination of the
proper R&D category.
The evaluation of proposals or projects begins with the idea and
does not cease until the end result has been phased out of the system.
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The classification process provides an initial screening for desirability.
Chapter 4 considers two successive phases of evaluation, the first of
which is required to produce the PTA, and the second, the TDP.
Extensive review at higher levels is currently required for both phases.
It is suggested that the review, justified by recurrent difficulties
in formulating the R&D program, may be substantially reduced. The
first requirement for the reduction is the promulgation of weighted
objectives. The second is the acceptance of fact that the information
desired for a decision on project selection is not available in the
desired accuracy or detail. These preliminary decisions can be made
more efficiently by the activity managers, provided they have reason-
able information on the relative importance of objectives. The
reduction of review can cut lead times by decreasing the time required
for decisions and the volume of communications.
The following information about proposed projects must be
evaluated:
(1) characteristics and military value of outputs
(2) probability of successfully attaining the objective
(3) costs required to introduce the output into service
(4) time required to make the product operational
(5) personnel and facilities required to complete R&D
(6) reliability of desired product
(7) trade offs between cost, reliability, and time
Much of this information is not obtainable on proposals as they first
enter the system, and the initial estimates are generally inaccurate.
The phase I evaluation is envisioned as a rapid but thoughtful
preliminary investigation of the value and feasibility of proposals. It
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is suggested that rather than attempt to overcome the uncertainty with
detailed evaluation at this point, the managers should merely accept
the uncertainty and develop empirical estimating relationships to
compensate for it. Proposed interrelationships continue to develop,
and the supporting communications and cooperation are established.
The magnitude of effort should be measured in man-hours, rather
than man-years. Problems in development can be predicted, and
support at more fundamental levels can be requested. An early start
of actual development can be made in these problem areas. The phase I
evaluation requires flexibility of personnel assignment and a set of
basic estimating relationships at each activity. The possibility of
transferring personnel from completed projects to phase I evaluation
and literature review should be considered.
The phase II evaluation is considerably more detailed, but it must
also accept the unavailability of all desired information. Alternate
solutions are defined and displayed on PERT diagrams. Estimates
become more accurate; personnel and facilities requirements for
R&D and initial estimates of production, operation and maintenance
requirements can be made. All of the initial estimates suggested in
the multi-purpose reporting form (Figure 7.-1) should be supplied.
Additional information on military values is required to make trade-off
decisions. The procedures used for reliability estimations provide a
good model for other estimating techniques, but the attempt to acquire
more accurate information than is available must again be avoided.
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One aspect of the evaluation is whether or not the work should be
performed in-house. If the Navy has the capability, the work is
generally done in-house. Contractors and consultants may be used to
smooth the work load. If the personnel and facilities are not available,
it may be desirable to acquire them in the presence of a continuing
need and the absence of experienced contractors. In each activity, a
knowledge of the capability of other Navy activities is required to take
full advantage of in-house capabilities.
Current procedures for contractor selection are difficult to apply.
The attempt to quantify subjective appraisals of military worth of
existing and planned capabilities can provide a basis for measurement
of previous contracting performance. The retention of successive
estimates of the multi-purpose project reporting form will help in this
evaluation, and the post-operational evaluation will indicate what the
contractors and activities have learned from previous attempts.
The Contract Formulation/Contract Definition procedures again
attempt to acquire levels of accuracy and detail that are unobtainable.
This results in delays in reaching agreements and making decisions.
Mutual respect and cooperation are essential to project success. They
are difficult to write into a contract, but the contracting procedures
must be flexible enough to permit sequential decisions. Realistic
use of trade offs is being encouraged and should prove very helpful.
Some authors have recommended that the contractors be allowed to
make the trade-off decisions, but it is felt that this is an infeasible
2lo
and irresponsible move that the military cannot make. The contractors
should be encouraged to consider and recommend trade offs, but the
decision must remain with the men who will use the end products.
Procedures for sharing both the risks and benefits of the R&D efforts
must be developed.
Parallel development is encouraged and facilitated by the expanded
search for alternatives, the classification process, and the evaluation
process. An objective evaluation should be made of all manners of
achieving desired goals, down-graded objectives, and interim solutions.
The primary considerations in the decision for parallel development are
the military value of the project, including the magnitude of improvement
over existing capabilities; the degree of uncertainty in achieving success
by alternative paths; the costs of alternative paths; and the qualitative
differences (technological independence) of alternative paths. It is
essential that these quantities be evaluated and that the existence of
parallel paths be known and controlled.
There are numerous differences in the information and estimates
for the five research and development categories. Measuring the
potential contribution of research projects to development projects and
increasing the input of fleet information to the research activities may
lead to better means of allocating funds to the research category and to
projects within that category. Similar measurements may prove helpful
in the Exploratory Development Program.
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Increased use of Advanced Development projects can be effective
if it can avoid some of the administrative restrictions placed on Engineer-
ing and Operational Systems Development projects. If coordination of
project or system component can be achieved without detailed and
formal management, the component research may progress more
rapidly.
The processes discussed above are most directly applicable to the
Engineering and Operational Systems Development projects, although
the latter projects are much more complex. The systems development
projects usually receive the full treatment, starting with development
of a particular scenario and ending with a voluminous report. Computer
models and optimization techniques are usually employed in the evalua-
tion. There is an unfortunate tendency to view this analysis as a one-
shot process, rather than as a working tool for updating and revising
the development plan and evaluating trade-off decisions. The great
length of the reports degrades their communications effectiveness. The
failure to list and evaluate assumptions is very critical. The uncertain-
ties which must be treated in the report make the inclusion of dissenting
opinions valuable aids to evaluation.
The dynamic nature of the R&D process makes it difficult to apply
most standard optimization techniques to project selection. The model
developed in Chapter 5 attempts to convert present subjective procedures
into quantified, computerized selection to make the manager's job less
difficult. The model and its inputs are summarized in Figures 5-3
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and 5-4. The objective function incorporates the primary characteristics
estimated in the evaluation process:
Maximize E*** =r[/n(l + T.)l 1 K»E.(E. - E. ) - C.(IOC - IOC. )x-
i
L lj i l iQ i v i V
+ £ £ dik xi xk
i k
~L f (project duration) ^(project effectiveness)
i
*-
- h(project cost) x.
+
L, Z. ^(incremental effectiveness of combinations
i k
of projects) x. x.
The project effectiveness is measured by the expected military
potential, and, by the difference between the expected potential and the
value of the current capability. This term includes the probability of
project success. Both terms are used to allocate effort in proportion
to the category importance and the magnitude of the advance in effective-
ness. The quadratic expression J{ (• ) adds the increases of effectiveness
resulting from combinations of included projects. Both g(* ) and X(" )
may contain the probability of success.
The cost function h(* ) measures the cost of acquiring the new
capability and the difference between new investment and operations,
and replacement and continued operation of the existing capability.
The latter permits acceptance of cost reduction projects. End item
reliability is used to increase the cost of achieving the desired effective-
ness. The time function f(« ) includes the benefits of obtaining results
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quickly, but degrades the importance of timing considerations rela-
tive to the other factors.
The problem is constrained by the availability of R&D funds,
personnel, and facilities. The other constraints are used to control
project interrelationships. A modification of the program is provided
to permit parallel development. The input "projects" are defined to
include alternative technological paths and effort levels.
Concepts of balancing the R&D program are difficult to define
and apply. The objective function is designed to reduce the bias
toward short-range, quick-return projects. Balance must be reviewed
subjectively after the recommended program is generated by the model.
Continuity of the program is also important; frequent stops and starts
disrupt the R&D program. The continuity considerations require that
project definitions be frequently updated with new estimates of cost,
time, probability of success, etc. It is possible to add an artificial
bias to projects which are already underway to increase continuity,
or the model can be used to select only such projects from the inactive
list as may be undertaken by the reduced number of personnel facilities,
and funds available, given that no current projects are to be dropped.
The programming of the model is difficult. A ready-made solu-
tion has not been found, but there are several approaches which indicate
that the solution is obtainable. As an interim measure, the following
procedure is suggested:
(1) Compute the value of the objective function for each potential
project. (A cut-off point may be established below which
projects will not be considered in the selection model. )
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(2) Order the projects by decreasing value.
(3) List separately the potential incremental values for pairs of
projects.
(4) Define a set of alternative programs which satisfy the person-
nel, facility, and R&D funding constraints. (The projects with
highest value may be included until the constraints are
approached, as a general rule of thumb. )
(5) Compute the full value of the objective function for each program
defined.
(6) Review the results for potential areas of improvement; redefine
programs and recompute as desired.
(7) Select the program with the highest value of the objective
function.
This is an unsophisticated, brute -force approach, but it can generate
many useful results while the optimization techniques are being
developed.
Chapter 5 discusses a number of optimisation techniques which
have been suggested for use in the R&D process. Briefly, these
techniques are the industrial dynamics approach, a set of differential
equations representing the rates at which knowledge is acquired and
applied, a linear programming selection process for research, some
subjective and quantitative selection "rules of thumb," an accounting
model, and a chance-constrained R&D funding program.
Chapters 6 and 7 address the problem of controlling research and
development in progress. The model is used specifically for project
selection, and since the selection process is going on more or less
continually, the model is a control device. It requires a great deal of
input information, and its output represents a similarly large volume
of information in highly condensed form. It is suggested that the PERT
diagrams required in the TDP's be displayed together to provide model
inputs and display outputs.
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The individual PERT diagrams can easily be modified to show the
use of personnel and facilities. By combining this information from
each project, the input for two of the model's constraints can be deter-
mined. Samples of these displays are presented in Figures 6-1 and 6-2.
A considerable effort may be required to extract the essential informa-
tion from the TDP. A suggested modification -- and condensation --
of the TDP is developed in Figure 7-1. This modification calls for
only 16 pages, with much of each page left blank in the early stages to
permit convenient retention of early estimates and addition of new
information and revised estimates. It is recognized that additional
pages may be necessary in some cases, but the goal is reasonable and
desirable. The form is to be used as a working document and for updat-
ing the activity manager's master plan. As significant changes occur,
they are indicated on the form, forwarded to the activity manager, and
transferred to the multi-PERT presentation. The same report can be
used to update the project definitions, and another iteration may be
performed with the model. This procedure is recommended for use
even with relatively small projects. It shows the manager what has
been done, what remains to be done, and which activities require
special attention.
The use of PERT diagrams to show the relationships between
projects is standard procedure. Some newer developments include arc-
transition probabilities in addition to the conventional PERT information.
The potentials of PERT are still being extended, and further study --
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including graph theory applications -- may develop additional project
selection techniques.
The control process requires standardization in many areas. The
modified TDP form suggested in Chapter 7 can be used for control,
reporting to higher management levels, and data analysis. This certainly
contributes to standardization. The use of standardized estimating
procedures was mentioned earlier. The amount of documentation and
explanation required could be substantially reduced from the current
needs, but the engineering estimates applied to the statistical estimat-
ing relations must still be indicated on the report. Standardization of
evaluating and reporting procedures facilitates and simplifies the
transfer of information.
A reduction in the amount of top level review for control is a pos-
sibility which deserves detailed examination. Lead times can be
significantly reduced by speeding the decision process. If the activity
managers and project managers are supplied with a current evaluation
of objectives, they are in the best position to make the selection and con-
trol decisions. If they are permitted to make the decisions and proceed
with work, the work can progress more rapidly and the higher levels of
the organization can return to "management by exception. " Top manage-
ment thus gains more time for critical decisions when the desired
information is fully available. The volume of reports is reduced to
simplify review and accelerate decision-making.
The transition between projects can be smoothed by permitting
decisions at the activity level. The need to convey the many changes
in an R&D program through the chain of command can easily introduce
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unnecessary delay in proceeding with new projects. The policy of
assigning personnel to literature review and phase I evaluation enables
the manager to have the next project team ready to go to work as soon
as facilities become available.
The efficient combination of accounting, budget planning, and
military planning on a year -'round basis yields high dividends in
program continuity and control. A flexible personnel assignment policy
is mandatory in coping with the uncertainty of the R&D process and in
improving communications. Bringing researchers into the planning
process in phase I and in subsequent evaluation and updating of the
multi-purpose reporting form can increase the researchers' apprecia-
tion of the managers' problems and their personal satisfaction.
The importance of accurate and timely communications has been
apparent throughout. The complexity of the organization, the magnitude
of uncertainty and frequent revisions of estimates, and the dynamic
nature of the R&D process make efficient communications absolutely
necessary. The classification and evaluation processes are designed
to improve communications, as is the multi-purpose reporting form.
Formal but concise documentation of information transfer has been
stressed throughout.
A centralized coordinating point is desirable to remove the book-
keeping functions of the review process from the offices of the CNR,
CND, and DCNO(D).
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The development of a substantial data base is one of the established
goals of the research and development process. Unfortunately there has
been a great deal of wasted effort in this area. Many previous reports
contain inconsistent or unexplained data and estimates. Statisticians
can physically combine data on the basis of the project title, but they
cannot be held responsible for an interpretation of the results if the
quantities being estimated are not accurately and consistently defined.
Critical values have been hard to identify and more difficult to
measure. This has caused them to be omitted altogether in many
instances. Without an attempt to evaluate the critical values in opera-
tional systems, the estimating procedures cannot improve.
Decisions which are left undocumented are most unlikely to yield
to an evaluation of reasons for either marked success or failure. The
omission of data on unsuccessful projects will greatly restrict evalua-
tion of failures.
Even with thorough documentation and an extensive data bank,
statistical estimates are strained by the usual requirement for extra-
polation. The extensive use of engineering estimates as a means of
refining the statistical estimates is highly recommended. It is also
necessary to determine which characteristics are identifiable in the
initial planning stages to provide a basis for empirical approximations.
There are logical reasons to provide a centralized automated data
processing capability, and equally logical reasons for maintaining such
a capability at each activity where the data can be most easily updated
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and where it is most frequently used for estimating. The tremendous
volume of information which is ultimately desired points toward future
decentralization of ADP. Whether the data is centrally located or not
is secondary to the promulgation of information on the types of data
which are available.
The procedures proposed herein require new data on the military
values of projects and probability of success. Both may contribute to
a means of measuring the return on research and development efforts,
which in turn can improve the allocation of effort and funds among
projects, among categories, and to Program 6 among the DoD programs.
The inadequate post-operational analysis is the most serious
deficiency in the entire R&D process. Measured against existing capabili-
ties in R&D management, it is the only serious deficiency. Failure to
exploit post-operational analysis of projects is inexplicable and
deplorable. The post-operational analysis is an indispensable means
of providing feedback to estimating procedures, data banks, model
formulation, and the R&D community in general. Activities and con-
tractors performing R&D projects should be formally required to complete
a thorough analysis of their technological and managerial techniques
used in each project, and to report the results. The multi-purpose
report form and the specific listing of assumptions are both essential
to the post-operational analysis.
This concludes the summary. The preceding chapters provide
amplifying information and description of reasons supporting the
techniques and procedures listed briefly in this chapter.
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Chapter 10. Conclusions.
Thus, trying to look into the future intelligently is the thing
which causes every research administrator to lose sleep.
This is when the wisdom to make proper choice, patience
to await results, and strength to justify expenditures become
so important. 144
The complex, uncertain, and dynamic nature of the research and
development process pose extremely difficult problems for the manager,
There are no easy solutions; the characteristics quoted above can only
continue to grow in importance. The purpose of this analysis was to
find and develop procedures to assist the manager in making decisions.
The conclusions are listed below.
1. The Navy has well-defined procedures for R&D management.
The procedures compare favorably with generally accepted manage-
ment policies
.
2. The search for alternative projects should be expanded. Fleet
problems and proposals should be solicited directly. This would in-
crease the relevance of R&D projects and permit greater utilization of
the Navy's officer and enlisted training program.
3. A thorough search of topic literature is necessary, but it is
nearly impossible at present. Bibliographic services are required




4. A centralized clearinghouse or coordinating point is proposed
to serve the following functions:
(a) classify incoming proposals
(b) establish early communications and cooperation on inter-
related projects, and provide control of parallel develop-
ment
(c) combine activity listings of the type of data available, for
general promulgation
(d) perform bookkeeping integration of activity research and
development programs for CNO, ASN (R&D), SECNAV,
and other offices.
5. The sequential availability and accuracy of estimates and infor-
mation require closer attention.
(a) The evaluation process attempts to acquire greater esti-
mating accuracy than is available at any given step.
(b) Extensive delays occur in CF/CD phase because of
contractor-government disagreement on details; more
flexibile contracting procedures are required to permit
sequential decisions.
(c) Excessive review before information is available for
decisions results in further delays; phase I review should
be expedited at work level and removed from top-level
control.
6. A small percentage of scientists and engineers should be
assigned to phase I evaluation and literature review on a rotating basis
at each activity.
7. Control and use of parallel development are facilitated by the
expanded search for alternatives, the classification process, and the
evaluation process.
8. Optimization models developed for systems development pro-
jects should be used throughout project development to evaluate trade
offs and identify deviations from expected results.
9. The model developed in Chapter 5 approximates current subjec-
tive selection techniques and is useful in both long-range planning and
interim reallocations.
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10. The multi-PERT display complements the model in all phases
of selection and control.
11. The multi-purpose reporting form should be used for evalua-
tion, control, and reporting. Its advantages are:
(a) concise presentation of critical information
(b) improved continuity through all phases of project life
(c) convenient presentation of project history for review,
data compilation, and post-operational analysis
(d) reduction in number of reports required.
12. There is a tendency for decision levels to rise. They should
be forced downward as close to the working level as possible.
13. The development of the data bank continues to be critical.
Documented reporting is essential. Specific investigation is required
of:
(a) accuracy of estimates as a function of project life time
(b) empirical relationships to compensate for error trends
(c) engineering estimates of differences between proposed
project and the established average
(d) critical values identifiable early in project life cycle
(e) unsuccessful projects
(f) new data on military value of projects as a means of
measuring the returns on R&D effort.
14. The attempt to quantify the military potential of proposals is
necessary.
(a) A measure of R&D output is required to replace such
unfortunate measures as the volume of published material.
(b) Knowledge of the value of objectives and projects is
essential to the formulation of an effective R&D program.
(c) Knowledge of the value of objectives and projects is
essential to lowering the decision level to permit man-
agement by exception.
15. Rapid, accurate, and documented communications are
essential to the entire R&D process.
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16. Inadequate post-operational analysis of the planning, evaluat-
ing, modeling, and technological methodology is the most serious
deficiency in current practices.
(a) Post-operational analysis is the only means of establish-
ing adequate evaluation, feedback, and correction of
management techniques.
(b) Post-operational analysis should be a formal requirement
for all Navy activities and contractors.
17. The following additional areas are identified for further study.
(a) information flow rates in Navy R&D activities
(b) probabilistic modifications to PERT, including ARMNET,
Modern MISER, and graph theory
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I Strategic Forces- -combines former categories of strategic
retaliatory forces and continental air missile defense forces
(FBM force)
II General Purpose Forces- -relied upon for combat operations
short of general nuclear war (Navy units other than FBM
force)
III Specialized Activities- -includes intelligence and security,
national military command system, communications, and
other activities
IV Airlift/Sealift Forces- -provide airlift and sealift for troops
and cargo (MSTS)
V Guard & Reserve Forces- -equipment, training, and adminis-
tration of Reserve and National Guard forces
VI Research & Development- -all R&D prior to decision to produce
for inventory
VII Logistics- -wholesale supply and maintenance activities
VIII Personnel Support- -includes most training activities, major
medical activities; absorbed retired pay category
DC Administrative— general overhead costs
Military Assistance- -separate program, but computer will
accept only 9 program numbers
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